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+NTRODUCT1QN . 
This study examines the role of agricultural 
policies, past and present, adopted by the various governments 
of Pakistan in agricultural development and suggests, at the 
end, some alternative policy approaches to achieve· key objectives 
which past policies have failed to achieve. It is not concerned 
with policy-making as an institutional discipline which should 
help to make better policy nor with the dynamics of decision-
making except occasionally for illustrating a point . 
Agricultural policies can be viewed as a comprehen-
sive, broad framework of action plans relating to crop pro-
duction, animal husbandry, fisheries, forestry, plant protection • 
water-management, improvement of cultural practices,biological 
control of water-logged and salt-affected soil and to the 
associated institutional mechanisms such as land reforms, land 
utilization and tenure, co-operatives, procurement and supply 
of key agricultural inputs, subsidies and price-supports, 
agricultural extension,research, marketing, storage and so on . 
This study does not go into the detail of policies relating to 
all of these technological and institutional factors; it is 
confined specially to the socio-economic problems created by 
the agricultural modernisation programmes and policies pursued 
by the successive governments of Pakistan after independence in 
1947 and to the policy options that can be suggested for dealin§ 
with these problems. First chapter provides background infor-
mation about agriculture in Pakistan and its administrative 
set up~ second, third.and fourth chapters examine ~hrODQlogically 
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the ;i:-ole of public policies in agricultural development in 
Pakistan from 1947 to 1977, chapter 5 illustrates the nature 
of the problem confronting the policy-makers of the present 
t,1' 
regime in the agricultural sector and chapters 6 and 7 provide 
some al~ernative policy approaches to agricultural development 
in Pakistan for the decade of 1980s and onwards . 
What is development and what is agricultural 
deyelopm,ent? This study does not touch upon the various 
controversial theories of developm,ent and agricultural 
deyelopII}ent; it 'Yiews a{;;i:-icul tural development specifically 
in the context Of Pakistan. It focusses on the nature of 
the p,roble)lJ as it exists. -today in the rural areas of Pakistan 
and on tb · how it can be solyed by developing the existing 
ayailaole land resources. Agricultural development, as seen 
tn this study, is intended to reduce poverty. Agricultural 
policies, therefore, must be designed not only to increase 
production and raise productivity but also to improve food 
supplies to the poorer sections of the society. Improved food 
supplies and nutrition should also be accompanied by basic 
services such as health, and education. Agricultural develop-
\ 
ment, therefore, is closely intermeshed with the development 
of other sectors; it encompasses improved productivity, 
increased emplo;yr.ient·_antl thus higher incomes j,or the __ target 
groups in ordeT to benejit fxom the basic services provided 
by other sectors. Such a programme might be made up of single -
secto.r or :mul ti-secto;ral projects, with components implemented 
concurrently o~ in sequence, but in the rural areas of 
Pakistan where most of the people live on land, they can hope 
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to improve their conditions by improving agricultural sector.'. s 
performance. This kind of strategy to meet everyone's basic 
needs - food, clothing, shelter, education, health,sanitation, 
clean drinking water and some public transport - can, therefore, 
be made successful by developing agriculture . 
A strong commitment to growth with social justice 
at the national level is necessary if the impact of agricul-
tural development is to be effective and broadbased. Often, 
economic policies are inconsistent with distributive growth . 
Price policies that favour manufacturing and processing . 
industries, and those whicp~aim to keep food prices low in 
urban areas, work against it. Subsidies on farm. :, inputs, in 
such cases may be justified, but the bigger the farmer, the 
larger the amount of subsidies he would consume by investing 
relatively more on subsidized inputs and widen, in this way, 
the already existing gap in the levels of income between him 
and the smaller farmer . 
The agricultural policies pursued by the successive 
governments of Pakistan after independence have been lacking a 
strong commitment to growth with justice with the result that 
the benefits accruing from the modernised agricultural tech-
nology have gone to a comparatively narrow segment of,society, 
to the middle and larger landowners. The masses of small farmers 
have not benefitted at that scale. Indeed they may well be worse 
off. The great need for higher employment opportunities has 
been hampered by mechanisation and social and political tension 
increased by the wide disparity between what the small farmers 
have got and what the better-off classes of farmers h~ve got 
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f,:i;o_pJ. deyelopment. If the cu;r;rent style of agricultural moderni-
- . 
sation- is allowed to continue, the bright development potential 
of the so called green revolution will be frustrated by the --
-exist;ing distribution of economic_ and political power which 
pe;rm,its a ;few enterprising farmers to reap the larger share of 
the gains. 
Ag;ricultu;ral modernisation is necessary for economic 
considerat;ions but social considerations also must be given 
due weight if it is to be made viable in terms of its continuity 
with stal5.ili ty. One way to do it is to build in to the new 
technology the elements that would secure social justice along-
side inc::reases in pcroductiyi ty. The study, )accordingly, suggests 
at the end alte;rnatiye policy approaches which can secure 
equi tabl_e, ;i;f not equal, gains of agricultural modernisation . 
Any p-;roblem or a set of socio-economic problems can 
be exa;IIJined _:i:;rom two di,f;ferent perspectives. The first involves 
analysis o;f alte::rnatiyes and is no:r:mative i.e. deals w~th the 
desirability o;f proposed courses ~f action and prescriptions 
;for the advancement o;f selected values and target groups .. _The 
second is--the description and analysis of existing practices 
and situations and the predic~ion of what is likely to happen 
unde;r given sets of conditions. Tbe two approaches are,however, 
·- . 
interdependent. Those who seek to prescribe policies recognize 
' 
the need for empirically based knowledge and tho.se whose 
interest is in economic behaviour often select problems for 
study because· of their probable policy relevance. The two 
approaches, accordingly, tend to fuse here . 
/ 
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CHAPTER-I . 
AGRICULTURE IN PAKISTAN - BACKGROUND AND ADMINISTRATIVE 
SET UP 
Pakistan has a total area of 796,096 Square Kilometres 
inhabited by 83.782 million people. At independence from the 
British Raj on 14 August, 1947, it had basically an agricultural 
economy but since then its economic edifice has undergone many 
structural changes. Its main agricultural crops are wheat,rice, 
maize, cotton, sugar cane and tobacco; principal industries 
include cotton textiles, sugar, vegetable ghee (oil), cement, 
fertilizers and engineering goods. Due to higher demand for 
the imports of machinery and raw material for development and 
essential consumer commodities, its imports are more than the 
exports. The main exports include rice, cotton and cotton 
products, leather and leather products, carpets and rugs, 
engineering goods etc; its chief imports consist of petroleum, 
1 
tea, edible oil, chemical fertilizer and machinery . 
Pakistan comprises of four provinces, federally 
administered tribal areas (FATA) and Islamabad Capital territory . 
The provinces are Punjab (205,345 sq. km. in area), Sind (140, 
914 sq. km.), North West Frontier Provtnce CNWFP)(74,522 sq.Km), 
Baluchistan (_347 ,188 sq. km), Federally Administered tribal 
areas (27,221 sq. km,) and Islamabad Capital territory (906 sq . 
Km.). 28.28 per cent o:J:' its population is urban and 71.72 per 
cent is rural. Male Female ratio is 111 : 100 and density per 
square kilometer is 105. Literacy rate is 24%, out of which 
rural population's literacy rate is 15.5% and Urban population'E 
. 2 45.5%. Female population's literacy rate is 11 per cent . 
The total number o:J:' villages in Pakistan is about 
45000and the total number of districts is 81. This number 
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includes political agencies in the tribal areas as well . 
There is a tTemendous variation in the size, population and 
topography of the districts and in their level of development . 
There is also variation in the urban - rural complex. The 
district of Lahore in the Punjab, for example, is more ur-
banized than the district of Mianwali. There are further 
differences in physical facilities such as communications and 
transportation, in the cultural heritage like language pattern, 
in the nature and extent of 'political expression and in the 
attitudes of people toward government. Three or four districts 
grouped together make a division. There are in all 19 divisions . 
Each district is administratively sub-divided into tehsils 
(i.e. sub-di visions), Thanas (_i.e. police stations), qanun-go 
and patwa-r (_revenue sub-divisions) circles. These smaller 
units are primarily designed for revenue and police adminis-
tration. Qanungo and Patwari are the village level land 
revenue assessing and collecting officials. They are assisted 
by the 'Yillage headman, (_Lambardar) and the village watchman, 
(Chowkidar). The land revenue administration is located, in 
de·clining order o,f size in the provincial headquarters, 
divisional headquarters, district headquarters, tehsil head-
quarters, and in the village. The most important administrative 
unit is the district where some of the smaller units of 
departments such as irrigation, WAPDA (Water and Power Develop-
ment Authority), Communications and Works have different 
areal sub-units and cut across the revenue and police units . 
The districts were created primarily for the purposes of 
revenue administration. At the district level, the department 
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of magistracy and land , ;revenue , administration is important 
and is headed by the Deputy Commissioner in his capacity as 
district magistrate and land revenue collector. He is theore-
tically ·spealdng,concemed.with·nDSt of :the regulaipry fmetions of the:; 
district and is normally not required to interfere in the 
operation of most of the activities taking place in the depart-
ments concerned with development but, in practice he may, 
occasionally, have to perform some development functions. The 
other important person in the district is the chairman, district 
council. He is the elected representative of local councils in 
the distTict and in-charge of development functions. As the 
Deputy Commissioner is assisted by Tehsildar at Tehsil level 
and Qanungo and Patwari at the village levels in administring 
land~Teyenue and other allied matters, the chairman, district 
council is assisted by the chairman tehsil councils and 
. . · 1 3 chairman, union counci s . 
Inspite of the various administrative reforms to 
curtail the power of the district administrator in Pakistan, 
the Deputy Commissioner (D.C) continues to be an embodiment 
of government power at the local level. He is the major force 
to co-ordinate policy of any kind at the level, of.:administration 
including co-ordination ot significant development activities 
which theoretically fall within the jurisdiction of the district 
counc~ls. Although there are field workers at lower levels 
the real distance, in terms of communications within the 
bureaucracy, between the village and the district headquarters 
is great. Similarly, the tier of chairman district council 
was re-introduced just in 1979 after the abolition of the 
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Basic Democracies system in early 70s, and is, as such, 
weaker as compared to the powers exercised by the D.C. co-
operatives are weak and village Panchayats have just been 
introduced in December, 1982 in some parts of the Punjab; 
th_e village panchayats in other areas of the country are 
intended to be set up in 1983. Thus, uptil now, the authority 
and power of the local councils remained sapped and superseded 
by the administrators, 
Although the system of local bodies has been intro-
duced where the D,C. now exercises regulatory functions or at 
least theoretically is required to limit his jurisdiction of 
functions to regulatory actiyities, yet, in practice, the 
higher civil servants and politicians are more likely to 
support the D,C. On the grounds that he can provide integration~ 
co7"ord·ination and ini tiatiye togethe'.1' with the future-oriented 
vision o~ a1I).odern intellectual, which usually lack elsewhere 
in the rural Pakistani environment. This is more so because 
the nrndian e:4perience with )?anchayat Raj does not indicate" 
that rural politicians." are- more acceptable· dec·ision:-:makers'.' l 
to development-oriented administrators~ There has been and 
there is in Pakistan an appreciation of the importance of 
decentralisation of development decision-making and of replace-
ment of colonial administration with indigenised administration, 
duly complemented by the village panchayats as conciliatory 
courts, but this perspective has never prevailed. The district 
administrator has a strong linkages with the higher bureaucratic 
hierarchy, being responsible to the divisional commissioner, 
located at divisional headquarters and to the Board of Revenue 
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TABLE-1 
LOCAL GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE LAND REVENUE ADMINISTRATIVE 
STRUCTURE 
Pakistan 
District Council (81) I I 
I 
Provinces (4) 
Talufu¥Tehsil Council (covering 50 I I I (2221 to 100 yillages) Divisions (19) 
I 
I 
I 
District/Agencies 
Union Council (representing 
about 10 villages)(3065) I I 
(81) 
Taluka/Tehsils 
Sources: 
: (222) 
I 
I 
Field Qanungo Circles 
I 
I 
I 
Patwar Circles 
I 
I 
I 
Villages 
(4500~ 
Inayatullah, "Local Administration in a 
developing country - Pakistan" in weidner etal 
(edit), Development Administration in Asia 
- - -- -- - -
Du~ham, Duke University Press, 1970 (P-288) 
(and updated from) Government of Pakistan, 
"Pakistan Economic Survey, 1981-82 11 Islamabad 
Finance Division, 1982 (P-177) . 
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and the provincial government located at the provincial 'he,adn11~ry~:,rs_ . 
Th~ local government's hierarchical structure, on the other hand, 
either ends up at the district level or at the most at the 
di vision al level (co-ordination - committees of local councils in 
the Punjab and Baluchistan exist at the divisional level whereas 
in the NWFP and Sind, they exist at the district levep. Land 
revenue and district administration, therefore, continues to 
attract more importance. It is paternalistic in nature which is 
justified by saying that it is the most suited to a rural popu-
lation whose predominant segment is illiterate. It is authoritian 
in nature which is necessitated for"maintaining powerful provincial 
administrations capable of assuring security and st abili ty51,' in 
contrast to the decentralized local governments. Political power 
centres in the provincial capitals in the struggle against (i) the 
growing influence of Islamabad and (ii) the decentralized local 
governments. The devolution of powers to local governments,-which 
has occurred from time to time in the short history of Pakistan, 
has taken place as a "response to the perceived needs of develop-
ment and not to the political demands of local communities and 
politicians for autonomy from provincial interference"~ This gives 
rise to the problem of displacement of goals. Local governments 
designed to achieve physical targets very often tend to overlook 
political development. In effect, representative local governments 
in Pakistan have so far helped identify the local leadership and 
through them local needs and aspirations, but they have failed to 
evolve a continued process of political development in rural areas . 
To suggest whether the present colonial district administration 
or indigenised local government administration 
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is more suitable for Pakistan is the most crucial policy 
issue and mainly outside the scope of this study. This study 
is mainly concerned with the role of administration in 
agricultural development in this chapter . 
Easy access to the district land revenue b'ureaucracy 
is undoubtedly useful for a variety of purposes in Pakistan . 
It is highly valued by the villager, provides added social 
prestige, but many of the advantages of such bureaucratic 
access have very little to do with the needs of the farmer . 
Bureaucracy, according to Nichalson, is likely to be one of 
key constraints on development. "Wherever critical elements 
of the development" he says "are controlled by the civil 
service or tied up in the hierarchies of the provincial 
secretariats, that bureaucracy is likely itself to be one of 
the key constraints or limits on development"? The farmer is 
much more concerned with the access to key farm inputs -
fertilizer, new seeds, and tubewell water - in order to develop 
his agriculture. These farm inputs donot require any access 
to land revenue and district administration, because they are, 
in most of the cases, available in the market where only the 
farmer's own purchasing power matters. Access to the district 
administration may be helpful in providing a license to carry 
arms, getting sugar and rice permits when needed in bulk or 
for sanction of an additional canal water supplies. In such 
exchanges, the larger farmers remain at a dist~nct advantage . 
The problem of improving farmer's access to the district 
bureaucracy and of strengthening their position when dealing 
with that bureaucracy was not critical for the success of the 
first stages of the green revolution in Pakistan and to some 
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extent is not critical now. Yet there are some direct bureau-
cratic controls over key inputs which frequently have an 
inhibiting effect on farmer's economic behaviour. But these 
controls lie within the jurisdiction of Agricultural Adm:t.n::: .. -· ) 
istration rather than district administration . 
AGRICULTURAL ADMINISTRATION . 
Pakistan is a federal state. Under the 1973 consti-
tution, the executive authority of the federation is exercised 
by the Federal Government in the name of the President. Under 
the constitution, there is a list of subjects to be dealt with 
by the federal government and another list to be dealt with 
by the Federal Government and '_. :P,rovincial Governments con-
currently. All the residual subjects of administration are in 
the purview of the provincial governments 8 . The subjeciBunder 
the federal government and in the concurrent and in the residual 
lists, at the level of federal government, are dealt with in 
the Ministries/Divisions of the federal government. Each 
Ministry is headed by a Ministe·r and may consist of one or 
more di~isions. Each division has a number of attached depart-
~ents, subordinate ojjices as well as autonomous and semi-
autonomous bodies. The ministries are responsible for policy -
making, directing implementation of policy and overseeing its 
implementation and execution. Actual implementation and 
e~ecution o~ policies is mostly the responsibility of the 
attached departments, subordinate offices, autonomous and 
semi-autonomous bodies or oj the provincial departments when 
the subject concerned is either in the concurrent or residual 
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lists. The government structure of the four provinces is 
similar to that of the federal government. The executive 
authority of a province is exercised in the name of the 
Governor by the provincial departments . 
Agriculture in Pakistan is a provincial subject . 
The impact of the federal government on it is indirect -
either through provincial administrations or by the manipu-
lation of basic economic parameters. All day-to-day adminis~ 
tration of agriculture is in provincial departments - including 
extension, the distribution of agricultural inputs (whenever 
in government hands), regulation of markets and most rural 
public works. Agriculture in the sub~continent evolved as a 
provincial concern and remains so in Pakistan after independence 
This constitutional and administrative position was necessi-
tated by the diversity of conditions, which vary from the 
sparsely settled and arid Baluchistan populated by tribal 
peoples to the dense canal-irrigated areas of Punjab. This 
diversity in ecological' settlement' c>ropping arid marketing conditions 
makes it almost impossible for the federal government to 
effect any detailed physical planning of the rural sector . 
The Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Co-operatives 
at the federal government level, is mainly responsible for 
inter,provincial co-ordination, planning and policy-making in 
respect of food, agriculture on farm, water-management, forest•ry·' 
:range-management ,soil and·wilcflife:: conservation and sericul ture . 
Its functions include control on the import and export and 
also preparation of the basic planning for the bulk allocation 
and fixing and issuing prices of foodstuffs and their procure-
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
--10-
ment, plant protection, crop insurance and collection and 
compilation of agricultural and forestry statistics on pro-
duction, consumption, and import and export. It als deals 
with the FAO, International Wheat Council, World Food Council 
and International co-operative alliance· .. The following_ Organisa-
tions-,inter alia, are __ under its administrative control: -
-1. Pakistan Central Cotton Committee . 
2 . 
3 . 
4. 
Pakistan Forest Institute. 
Pakistan Agricultural Research Council (PARC) . 
Pakistan Agricultural Storage and Services 
Corporation (PASSCO) . 
These Organizations, as their names indicate, are 
concerned at the federal government level, with the affairs 
of cotton, forest, research and storage and marketing of 
agricural f?.Ommoqi ties ;respectively-,_ The _nexus between .feder:al 
and P'rovincial agricultural policy is established in the Five 
year and Annual Deyelopment Plans. The parameters of the five 
year and annual development plans are set by the technocrats 
at the federal government level in the Planning Commission in 
consultation with the Ministry of Food, Agriculture and Co-
operatives and other related ministries like Ministries of 
Yinance, Commerce, Industries and the Water and Power. The 
Planning Con;unission makes recommendations to the Executive 
Committee of the National Economic Council (ECNEC) which in 
e 
turn~passes the plan on to a minis~rial level meeting of federal 
and provincial governments. The five year plan is approved by 
the NEC once in a five yeats period, whereas the annual plans 
for each ffscal year (First July - 30th June), which are 
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formulated within the framework and.keeping the policies and 
priorities of the 5 year plan in mind, are approved by it , 
annually. While the -medium term perspectf've is provided by 
the 5 year plan, annual planning is the p.raetical instrument 
for its implementation in a flexible .manner. As the recurrent 
budget is fixed every 5 years, the major flexibility in federal 
- provincial relations is found in the annual developmei;it plan . 
It is through this process that allocations-_fo_~ agriculture, 
among sectoral allocations, are made to and among provinces . 
So far as ag;riculture is concerned the bulk of the 
projects are initiated by the provincial gove.rnments and 
funded out of the p;royincial allocations in the annual deyelopb~ 
ment plan. Hence the involvement of the federal Ministry of 
Food, Agriculture and Co-operatives is minimal. On occasion, 
however, federal initiative is exerted in the form of specific 
p'.rog,rammes which are either federally funded or subsidized . 
Large projects in the agricultural sector may however, be 
entirely funded by the federal government, for example, the 
water-logging and salinity control p;rograIIJI11es. Or a .major 
programme, like the former Integrated Rural Development 
Programme (_IRDP), may, sometimes, be initiated by the Centre 
as part of the provincial development plans largely as a result 
of political pressure f-rom the top . 
The principles of inter~proyincial allocation of 
public investment are difficult to ascertain. The bulk of 
investment in Pakistan in agriculture is in the private sector 
and the government in the past has made little effort to 
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influence this private investment. Production - oriented 
agricultural policies of the various governments of Pakistan 
designed to maximise exports and wage goods have tended to 
bring scarce inputs ~nto the most productive regions and no 
major steps have been taken so far to correct the basic in-
equalities among the country's several regions. The centre 
has, no doubt, initiated programmes for the saline areas and 
the rain-fed areas of NWFP and Punjab, for example and it, 
there.tore, does evince a considerable symbolic interest in 
the agriculturally backward-· regions by making some public 
investment in the sector there but this appears to be far 
short o.f an equalizing strategy. Another weakness in Pakistan's 
agricultural policy has been in the link between the market -
'.II)anipulation and incentive strategies, which fall within ,the 
puJ'view o;E the ,tederal government and its field-level extelil-
sion and distribution programmes ~hich are administered by the 
. proyinci·al goyernmen ts. As ag,ricul ture is a provincial subject 
±n the constitution and as an administrative reality, there is 
little that the ;federal government can do to influence this 
aspect oj, the agricultural development programme. Lowdermilk; 
in his study o;E Multan, states that in all areas, the farmer 
is de:eictent in technical knowledge of how to get the maximum 
p~oductivity out of land and seed; the extension service 
adn}inistered by the provincial governments either does not 
reach the farmer, or its advice is deficient when it does and 
that delay in the supply of vital inputs and crucial infor-
mation frequently both makes it useless'9 . 
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Agricultural Administration at the provincial level 
is mainly the concern of the respective provincial A_gricul ture 
Depart~ents. The problem in the past and today is that Agri-
culture Departments in the four provincial headquarters 
have simply not been upto the task. For example the department 
in Punjab has 5 or 6 agricultural assistants in each tehsil 
and one Field Assistant in each union council area with an 
agricultural labourer to assist him. This is not a large staff 
if it really intends to provide extension and to manage dis-
tribution of key inputs to the farmers as well. The field 
staff is typically without either transporation or telephone . 
Thus, the Agriculture Department has not so far really managed 
to reach the villages. Lowdermilk reports that, in fact, the 
spread of High Yielding Varieties (HYV) and fertilizer cannot 
really be attributed to the government: at all, but to the 
inherent profitability of the innovation and word of mouth 
communication. Many of the larger and more progessive farmers 
do have fairly freqµent contact with the Agriculture Depart-
ment, but this is more likely the effect rather than the cause 
of their progressiveness-~~ 
A systematic arrangement to supply the farmer's needs 
WqS" .made_ during Ayub period with the, establishment of the 
Agricultural Development Corporation ~L the federal government 
level in 1961 whose function was to promote and distribute 
farm inputs and to act as a vehicle for the development of 
backward areas. In practice, however, it emerged as simply 
a wholesale distribution agent for imported fertilizers and 
seeds. Private sector fertilizer, produced by ESSO and Daud 
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Corporations, was ·supplied in the open market until ;fertilizer 
distribution was nationalized in October, 1973. The price 
di;fference between imported .fertilizer, andc·public• ·sector fer-
tilizer, on the one hand, and private sector fertilizer, on 
the other, was :reduced by a subsidy on the f~rmer and a sur-
chaTge on the latter. The Agricultural Development Corporation 
(ADC). was :eai:rly :e1e.xible in its marketing practices and made 
supplies ayailable to licensed private traders, co-operatives, 
and even opend its own distribution shops in areas which did 
not appear to haye other sources. Thus fertilizer was available 
both on the open 11).a,rket and through public or semi-public 
agencies 0 Jnsecticides and seed (_and fertilizer until 1961) 
appear to haye been dist;:ributed through provincial agriculture 
departments . 
In ~972, the ADC was abolished and a similar organi-
sation, the Agricultural Supplies Organisation replaced it . 
Its ,functions axe :;:;iII)il;:t;r, save that it turns oyer supplies 
di1rectly to ;p;royincial counterparts and has no direct role in 
distribution to the ·:ea:rmer. The operative principles of the 
new· r:royincial level or~anisations a;re not very different from 
those of the ADCo They use the private dealers and see their 
function as :regulato;ry. The :reason behind the involvement of 
the gove;rnII)ent is to .regulate distribution o;f agricultural 
inputs. This role of the government is promotional in nature, 
that is to ;persuade farmers to try new inputs and techniques . 
Second, this role is based on the profound mistrust of private 
sector on the part of administrators inspite of an active 
private t:rade in ;fe:rtilizer distribution. Third, government 
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involvement is necessitated by its emerging strategy of rural 
development. The private trade, it is argued is inclined to 
seek out the easiest and most profitable markets, essentially 
the larger farmers who go to market themselves and the areas 
close to markets. Because they have been dealing in scarce 
commodities, it is argued, the trade has had little incentive 
to practice aggxessive distribution techniques and the small 
farmer is left out. In addition, there.is an ~wareness that the 
bulk o.f Pakistan'·~ .farmers are still rel 1wtant to adopt the 
.full range oj inputs and techniques which are considered 
essential to boast production. Government control of fertilizer 
then permits not only to ~ackle scarcity but also provides an 
opportunity to put the farmer in direct touch with extension 
agentsi This, in tu;rn 1 assists the extension workers in prom-
ting their package o.f inputs and practices. For both ideolo-
gical and practical reasons, therefore, the administration has 
an interest in supe,rseding the private trade in services to 
the ;f; arme·r . 
The o.f.f icial role assigned to the low ranking agri-
cultural extension wo;rker demands promotion of general social 
and economic develo~ent in the predominantly agrarian rural 
set-up, a physical target not easily measurable. The rural -
based local ~ government elected official has also more or less 
the same development functions; to develop agriculture and to 
achieve economic and other physical targets. The role, 
_- _ . , of the extension agent with respect to local self-
goyernment, therefore, needs to be specified. He being the 
appointed official must have a clear cut relationship with the 
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elected local 9fficial, so that both can function within their 
own jurisdictions. The extension worker should ensure physical 
achievements but at the same time must permit a change in 
decision-making authority from the appointed to the elected 
official. This policy recommendation, however, needs.t0be 
imp~emented with the 1· 1 intended goal to replace the present, 
expensive and less eftective e_xtension agents with the: trained 
farmers as e;ffecti:ve e_xtension agents through the growing 
participation of elected representative~. The extension agent, 
in his own administrative set up, has a triangular relationship 
i.e. with the ;farmers to identify a problem, with the research 
agencies so as to ~urnish the ~armers with necessary data for 
,finding an answer t0 the problem and with the line department 
,for ensuring implem,entation. Hence a very close scrutiny of 
the existing ,functions, patterns and procedures should be 
carried out. The extension agencies need to be organised in a 
manner that a close linkage with the field as well as with the 
research organisations at the district or tehsil is established 
so that the timely action is taken to control pests and 
diseases • 
At pre$ent, bulk o,f the agricultural research in 
Pakistan is carried out in the provincial research institutions 
and uni--yersities. The Pakistan Agricultural Research Council 
(PARC) at the ,federal level largely performs: a co-ordinative 
role and finances most of the agricultural research projects 
in the country through directly funded research programmes . 
The capability of long range, multi-disciplinary research on 
major agricultural commodities and other problems in various 
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agricultural disciplines is still quite inadequate in the 
country at the federal or provincial levels. Most of the 
research institutions according to a PARC document have neg-
ligible trained staff or scientific facilities to undertake 
research oj, any kind - basic 1 applied, or adaptive and have 
just lingered on :f'.or decades without making any contribution~lS 
As stated aboye, Pakistan has a federal - provincial 
administrative set-~p, with agricultural production largely a 
responsibility of the local and the provincial governments 
while policy, planning and co-ordination are the responsibility 
of the federal goyernm,ent. Jndonesia, Brazil and Argentina have 
almost a simila,r set UJ?. Such agricultural administrative set-
up su,t:f'.ers ,:f-rom a poo,r linkage between agricultural research 
and extension in deyeloping countries. This problem can be 
resolyed by entrusting the functions of generation of new in-
j,ormation and the dissemination of knowledge to the farmers, 
to the s~m,e organisation. The directors of extension for various 
agro·-ecological regions and co.mmodi ties, (who presently belong 
to a separate organisation), i,:f placed on the campus of the 
concerned research institution or if made an integral part of 
the reppectiye resea~ch station, can establish a better linkage 
between deyelppJl}ent o:f'. improved technology and its r.dissemination . 
This can be easily done in Pakistan and without causing any 
major change in the existing set up because both the provincial 
research institutions and extension agencies are, in most of 
the cases, administered by the respective provincial agricul-
ture departments. Owing to the diversity in settlement and 
other conditions existing in the various regions in the country, 
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it would not be appropriate to place all agricultural research 
and extension exclusively with the PARC . 
The absence of facilities for marketing and storage 
can be a constraint on agricultural production. Presently both 
the federal government arid the respective provincial governments 
are engaged to expand their storage capacities. The bulk of 
, I 
the agricultural marketing is provided by the private sector, 
at the Mand;L (_Market) to,}¥ns leyel. The private sector enters 
~ ' 
into the .field th.rough AJYhties (·food grains dealers) and 
coIIJll}ission agents who are notorious for profiteering. The pro-
yincial goyern:ments have set-.up regulated markets at a few0places 
.:eor the conyenience 0.f farmers, but the number of such markets 
is very SJI)all. At the .federal government level, the Pakistan 
Agricultural $torage and Seryices Corporation have also set up 
godowns in the country, but the facilities of storage provided 
by the corporation a~e jar shorter than the mounting need for 
storage. Other agencies which provide storage facilities at the 
federal goyernJI)ent leyel are De.fence Di vision, National Lo_gistic 
Cell, Food Directorate, Rice Export Corporation (for export of 
;i;;Lce )_ a,nd Cotton Export Corporation (;for export of cotton). Well 
def.ined arrangem,ents exist ~or ma~keting of agricultural pro-
ducts .f0r export 1 but this cannot be said of marketing within 
the country 1 specially when production areas and consumption 
JI)arkets 1I}ay be f a,r apart in respect o;f certain commodities . 
With the adyent oj JI)odern agricultural technology and conse-
quent commercialization of agriculture, the so called back-
wardness of the majority of the farmers to understand the 
machinations of private traders is vanishing. They, in case 
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of most of the commodities produced by them, have been guaran-
teed min~mum government controlled prices. Experience during 
the Bhutto period reveals examples of the way in which the 
"bureaucrat~- manage-rs" of nationalized agro-based industries 
had sought bribes for "li;fting the farmer's produc~it". The 
thrust of the public policy should, therefore, be rather to 
regulate and promote private sector trade in the field of mar-
keting and storage, The~public~sector spould only provide 
planning and guidence and need not dist,u;rb_- (now denationalized) 
freer marketing system which asszures-~ better and timely returns 
to the grower. Public sector should, however, enhance its sto::- ~ 
rage capacity. According to one estimate, the present post-
harvest losses range ,:from 35 to 50 % in the case of perishable 
products and 10 to 15% in the case of foodgrains and seeds~~ 
Priority needs to be giyen to the improvement of existing ar::ran~-
ments for grading, parking, storage, processing and trans-
portation. The need jor storage is increasing further especially 
with the increasing utilization of threshers by the farmers 
which reduces the period of harvesting: .. The quantum of the 
storage capacity needs to be expanded both at the provincial 
and the national leyels; it is necessary both for the purposes 
o;f price stabilisation and National food security . 
Agricultural credit is an important vital agricul-
tural input. There are a number of organisations which are 
offering credit to the farmers. Agricultural Development Bank 
of Pakistan is -mainly directing its efforts for medium term 
and long term credits and has also embarked upon supervised 
credit. Federal Bank for co-operatives and the Provincial 
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Agricultural DevelopmentBanks and other commercial Banks also 
provide production loans. The provincial revenue departments, 
*' furthermore, advance taccavi loans. The most important develop-
ment which took place in 1978~79 has been the facility of 
interest free credit, channelled mainly through the commercial 
banks. The amount of this credit rose from Rupees 200 million 
in 1978-79 to Rs.348.003 million in 1980-81~5 This loan is 
admissible to small farmers owniing 12.5 acres or less of land 
for extending support for the purchase of inputs, irrigation 
facilities and farm Jnachinery. Introduction of an interest free 
cTedit is a good step, but credit generally still remains the 
bottleneck that keeps agricultural development at bay. It also 
is responsible largely for distorting the agrarian structure 
in favouT of the big landlord, the trader and the big farmer . 
According to the findings of M.H. Malik, the share of the credit 
extended throu~h the above-noted agencies in 1973 to smaller 
farmers- or even 'medium-sized farmers (i.e. less than 25 acres)),: 
hardly ~xceeded 30%1 eyand the position does not seem to have 
changed ~ery JTIUch since then. The Agricultural Development 
Bank of Pakistan is oriented towards the larger farmer. Its 
loans are mostly long term for Jnajor capital investments. The 
commerical bank's loans are more often than not advanced to 
middlemen for purchasing crops or for other trade purpos~s.-
According to widely circulating rumours in the Punjab, a size-
able portion of the agricultural credit allocated to the 
commercial banks by the government is rather advanced to the 
urban shop-keepers and retailers because most of the farmers 
donot apply for the credit owing to a lot of cumbersome pro-
cedures involved; those who do get it, often misuse it or 
* taccavi is a local term used for state agricultural loan . 
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donot repay it in time . 
The co-operative department, especially in the 
Punjab province, is an old and established department, but it 
has been widely criticized as being distapt from the farmer, 
bureaucratic and un-energetic. Co-operatives in general have 
not made much headway due to a variety of conceptional, organi-
zational, ,financial, and politico- social reasons~i The Federal 
Bank for co-operatives is now the principal~ institution for 
meeting the credit requirements of provincial co-operative 
banks and multi-unit co-operative societies. It is also to 
assist the ,f ede;ral and p:royin~i al ~gove:rnmen tg -tn , fQrmul ati0n,'. 
of:'schemes for development and revitalization of co-operative 
movemegt, arrange training in co~operative principles and co-
operative banking and ca;rry out research on problems of rural 
areas. But so ;far co-operatives in Pakistan remain "a very less 
succe(:'ls,jul e.xampJ..e" in the developing world. They have for 
the most part been credit co-operatives working quite indepen-
,, 
dently of the Agriculture Department or other private sector 
agencies which supply key inputs to the farmers. Farmers have 
been ma,rketing mostly through private traders so that credit 
has been -unrelated to the actual disposition of the crop . 
;Furthe-rm,o;re, the va,rious sources o,£ credit have never been 
integrated in the ;field, though' their common source of funds 
is the State Bank o;f Pakistan. Finaly, the co-operative socie-
ties do not appear to have done anything to mobilize rural 
savings. "If the ;farmers have been prospering and if the terms 
of trade are at least slightly in favour of the rural sector .... 
these developments donot appear to be reflected in any increasing 
assets of the co-operative societies1118, 
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CONCLUS'TON 
The land revenue administration in Pakistan is 
located, in declining order of size, in the provincial head-
quarters, divisional headquarters, district headquarters, 
tehsil headquarters and the villages, but the most important 
administrative unit, both f-rom the land revenue collection and 
Law and Order points of view, is the district. The apparatus 
of district administration, designed during the British Raj, 
continues~ to be authoritarian and colonial in nat.u:J?e, al though 
adjustments to modernisation have been made from time to time . 
Local government has been and is a desirable goal as 
well as a convenient instrument for the realization of admin-
istrative tasks. As a goal, it is visualized as an ultimate 
substitute for the already existing and well-entrenched admin-
istration through the transfer of functions of development 
planning. As an instrument 0.f" administration, '_t.t·:±s viewed as 
an extended arm of administration for the fulfillment of 
economic tasks. This giyes rise to the displacement of goals-
local goyernment institutions designed to achieve physical 
targets .fail to p:i;om,ote political development; the elected 
ojj~cial 1 consequently, tends to treat the local government 
instituttons as little better than any other government 
depart~ent. This 1I}ay cause apathy and cynicism among the rural 
people who 1I}ay ultimately identify local government with the 
already existing authoritrian administration . 
The nature of land revenue and district administratioL 
has a ve·ry minimal effect on agricultural development. Access 
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to the bureaucracy is not very critical to the farmer. wµat is 
critical is the access to the key inputs reqliired for effective 
farming. Key inputs are either available in the open market or 
their availability requires access to the officials in the 
agriculture department. Agriculture in Pakistan is a provincial 
subject; the impact of the federal government on it is minimal 
and through provincial administrations. The efficiency of the 
respective provincial Agriculture Departments is, therefore, 
very vital. They have, however, not been upto the task;their 
extension agencies are ineffective and understaffed, their 
arrangements ;for·-suppilying key inputs to the farmers and their 
marketing, storage and credit facilities are inadequate, their 
co-operatiye depa,rt:rnent(:> are distant from the farmer and the 
scientific knowledge deyeloped in their research institutions 
is not prope~ly disseminated to the farmer through their ex-
tension agencies. Therefore, the provincial Agriculture Depart-
ments co_rppletely need to be revitalized by establishing and 
strengthening linkages between their respective field level 
e4tension and dtstribution prog,ra:mmes. Similarly the existing 
poor ltnkage between the 1Ilarket - manipulation and incentive 
strategies, p,royided by the ;fede-ral government, and the field -
Jeyel extenston and distribution arrangements, administered 
by tbe ppovincial governments, needs to be strengthened . 
The p,resent a~ricul tu,ral deyelopment strategy of 
pakistan, ~mplemented and administered in the present consti-
tuttonal and administrative constraints is promoting a lack 
of central guidence in programme administration and a lack of 
co-ordination between the investment and market strategies of 
the federal government and the administrative realities of the 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
-24-
distTicts. Effective and integrated agricultural policies in 
Pakistan would depend upon complementary action by the federal 
and the provincial governments. Co-operation and co-ordination 
is, therefore, critical. The federal Ministry of Food, Agri-
culture and Co-operatives and its attached departments seem 
to be the appropriate machinery jor developing consistent 
national agricultural policy. This Ministry is already responsi-
ble for making national agricultural policy, but some additional 
steps are ,required to be taken under which it may have some 
en~hanced role to direct and oversee its implementation in the 
provinces. Co-ordinated action in this regard will often requirE 
that the federal government provide financial incentives to 
encourage proyincial goyernments to achieve targets of the 
national agr±cultuTal policy . 
Agricultural policies play a vital role in agricul-
tural production. How public policies create barriers to agri-
cultural growth or ~acilitate it is the theme of the subsequent . 
three chapters . 
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CHAPTER-2 
~==-~ 
STAGNANT- AGRICULTURE - '{1947'-19'58) 
Pakistan1s is basically an agrarian economy. Agri-
culture is the largest single sector of the economy and _ 
accounts for 30% of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), employs 53% 
of the ,total lab.our .force, supports directly and indirectly 
70% of the population for their subsistence, contributes 80% 
o~ the country's foreign exchange earnings- 36% through export 
of agricul tu-ral prima-ry and 44% through agro-based industrial 
commodities -, provides -raw materials for major industries like 
cotton textiles and sugar as well as several medium and small-
scale industries. It is, therefore, evident that welfare of the 
vast majority of the population and even political stability of 
the country are critically dependent on efficient harnessing of 
the ag~icultural resources of the conutry on a progressively 
sustained basis to cope with the basic food needs of the fast 
growing population~ 
F.rom .1947 onwards, some progress has been made in the 
expansion o,f agr:icul tural production from year to year, but the 
growth_ has· not kept pace with either the requirements or expec-
tations. Roughly, Pakistan~s performance in agricultural sector 
can be divided into 4 distinct phases. The first is the phase 
of agricultural stagnation (~rom 1947-.1958); the second is the 
phase of agricultural revolution and of relative prospefity 
(~958-1971), the third is the phase of another agricultural 
stagnation (197i-1977), and the fourth is the phase of recovery 
from that stagnation. This and the subsequent two chapters 
examine the role o.f public policy in developing agriculture in 
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the (.and co-inciding with the) first three distinct phases . 
The next chapters are devoted to the examination of the present 
phase oj ~ecovery from agricultural stagnation and suggest 
alternatiye policy approaches to develop agriculture in the 
decade of 1980\s and beyond . 
Between 1947 and 1959, the rate of growth of agri-
cul tu,ral p,roduction in Pakistan. (In. :view"o.f _sepa::ratibn~of, .the East~- . 
Pakist,an_the~material used.in_ this study_ refers tg West Pakistan alone}:was 
substantially' less· than .fhe .!late ;0::( den:ographic increase:_ "Irideed ifH_..the 
j~rst dozen years after Independence agriculture was stagnant . 
What little growth was achieved", ~approximately 1.1% per 
annum jor both wings and 1. 3% per annum for West Pakistan -
u.\\'.aS due to an increase in the area under cultivation rather 
than to a ,rise in yi_elds associated with improvements in tech-
nique$!\~ f:n consequence 1 the citizenry had to bear a loss in 
real income du.ring the period and government policy promised 
little reliej. (Population growth rate during the period was 
2. 5% per annUII).. )_ nA stri:f:e..,.-ridden and inefficient political and 
adlI).inist,ratiye hierarchy paid little attention to development 
p:rog,ra1l)Il)e$ and ,failed either to mobilize domestic resources or 
to attract f,o,re~gn investment. Not until 1955 was the first 5 
yea,r plan launched - perhaps too late to turn the tide'! 3 
Far~erls position, during this period, became cri-
tical in the irrigated plains owing to (i) salinity and water -
lo_g_ging (2 )_ the over-crowding, erosion and hazardous dependence 
on rain in the submontane area, (3) the misuse of the huge 
r~ngelands and the smallness oj their contribution to the 
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country's economy, and '(4) the denundation in the hill catch-
ments and the flood hazards which resulted from it. These and 
other factors, pointed out by the "Report of the Food and 
Agriculture commission, 1960114 presented a sombre overall 
picture at a time when the biggest national priority was in-
creased agricultural production to feed a rapidly increasing 
population . 
In the 1940 s when the demand for the creation of 
Pakistan gathered momentum, the leadership of the Indian 
National Congress had described it as an economically absurd 
idea for, they said, the areas that were to be taken out of 
British India to form the new state were desperately poor. One 
of the muslim rejoinders to this argument was that the areas 
to form Pakistan had the "enormous agricultural potential" and 
there was some justification for such optimism~ After all, the 
western dis~ricts of the Punjab had been surplus in food ever 
since the opening up of the extensive- system of perenial canals 
in the rich alluvial doabs (land between two rivers, of Chaj 
and 'Rachna). Also the eastern districts of Bengal (former East 
Pakistan)_ ;p;roduced the bulk of India's Jute. Properly husbanded, 
the agricultu~al sectoT could sustain the development effort 
oj the new state of Pakistan. However, agriculture made little 
contribution to the g;rowth of Pakistan's economy in the first 
post ~ independence decade. That West Pakistan had become a 
jood deficit area after independence puzzled many people. One 
reason advanced in the Report of the Food and Agriculture 
Commission, 1960 was that before Independence, the West Punjab, 
while exporting wheat, was at the s•ame time, importing large 
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quantities of course grains from the East (now Indian) Punjab . 
This supply after independence was cut off. Some other reasons 
given in the report for the poor performance of agriculture 
were that (i) the increasing pace of urbanization had placed a 
higher pressure on wheat (ii) owing to the steady increase 
in population and to the upheaval caused by the exchange of popu-
_lat ion which otten xesulted in loss of leadership and a partial 
breakdown o::I'. community life, many leading men in rural life 
now found it more advantageous to transfer their interests and 
capital from farming to the developing industry and commerce 
in the towns (iii) educated people and men of means who might 
have invested in the agricultural field started moving to the 
Xowns to take advantage of the better amenities and newer 
opportunities (iv) without guidance and faced with a virtual 
breakdown in supply and marketing services after independence, 
the farmer was unable to play a full part in the national up-
surge of production~ All these reasons might have played a part 
in causing agricultural stagnation in the period under consi-
deration, but the most crucial of them seems to be (ii) above; 
that is the inability of the private sector to invest in 
_agriculture seems to have made much of the difference. Agricul-
ture stagnated in the 1949-1959 decade and prospered in the 
next mainly because the private sector's investment in agri-
culture had increased from 2.9% of the total national invest-
ment in the first decade to 3.5% in the next. The impact of 
public investment does not seem to have made much difference 
since in the same period it had declined from 2.5% to 2.2% 
(see table 2 overleaf). Private sector did not invest much in 
the agricultural sector presumably due to unsettled conditions 
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TABLE-2 
PERFORMANCE OF WEST PAKISTAN'S AGRICULTURAL SECTOR 
Share in Gross Provincial 
product (%) 
1949/50 
52 
1959/60 
49 
1968/69 
41 
Per capita income in the 
Agricultural Sector (Rs) . 
Total agricultural output 
per capita (Rs) . 
Public sector investment in 
agriculture as a proportion 
of the total investment(%) . 
Private sector investment in 
agriculture as a proportion 
of total investment(%) . 
Total foodgrains production 
per capita (Kg) . 
Per annum rate of growth of 
crop production (%) . 
214 197 
187 171 
2.5 2.2 
2.9 3.5 
188 151 
2.3 
, SDURCE. 
- -
Shahid Javed Burki, "The Development of 
Pakistan's Agriculture : Some Interdis-
ciplinary Explanation~ in Robert Stevens, 
Hamza Alavi, Peter Bertocci (eds.), 
Rural Development in Bangladesh and 
- --
Pakistan,CHonolulu : University of 
- - - -, 
Hawaii Press, 1976), P-291 . 
278 
195 
4.8 
202 
5.4 
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in this period but also due to slow rate of returns in the 
sector and also perhaps due to a number of bureaucratic controls 
on the prices of ~oodgrains, as we shall see later in this 
chapter . 
But these were not the only reasons. Pakistan's 
rrogress has been studied in the framework of a dual economy 
where, as W.H.Nicholls has pointed out, the process of indus-
trialization is looked upon as"the dual of the "law of the de-
clining ;reli:Ltiye i,Illpo;rtance of agriculture ?11 And this appears 
to be correct as the rate of public investment in agriculture 
declined as the process Of industrialization gained momentum in 
the country. This is also manifest from the declining contri-
bution '.Il}ade by agriculture to the grass provincial product, 
that is ,frO,Ill 52%in 1949 / 50 to 49%in 1959 /60 to 41%in 1968/69 . 
The contr~bution of large scale manufacturing, on the other 
hand~ increased ,tro,Ill 1.5% in 1948/49 to 15.4% in 1968/69~ This 
bias Of the public policies in favour of large scale indus-
tr~aliz~tion is also supported by the Report of Food and Agri-
culture Commission, 1960. The report says:-
"During the early days of re-organisation, 
priority was given to the Establishment and 
expansion of industries and the improvement 
of communications and ports. Of the balance 
of funds available for agricultural develop-
ment, the major portion went to large irri-
gation works and only comparatively little 
help was given to the agricultural production 
d . tl 9 II irec y ..... . 
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Thus one major reason for stagnation of the agri-
cultural sector during this period was the decline of the re-
lative importance of agriculture in the national policies in 
the decade of 50s. Moreover, there existed a cumbersome system 
of bureaucratic controls on agriculture. Many of these controls, 
such as the restrictive zoning of surplus areas and the com-
pulsory sale of surplus foodgrains to the government at less 
than market prices, had been introduced as war - time measures 
by the British Government in the 19401~. These measures remained 
in force uptil 1960 and the net result of these measures was 
that the farmer produced foodgrains either for his own consump-
tion or because his land was not good for another crop. While 
the gross output of foodgrains remained more or less unchanged 
in the rain-f,ed areas, it actually declined in the i,rrigated 
areas where the ,:earmer could switch over to cash crops and over 
which the cont-rols did not apply. Since the principal determinant 
of marketable surplus is the gross output of food crops, the 
~uantity of joodgrains marketed stagnated in this period. Thus 
the goyernment, by emphasising to produce ,f,ood crops and at the 
.sarre' ,tin-e by-deliberately keeping down the price of wheat and rice, 
contributed to the stagnation of agricultural productivity . 
As regards price subsidies, they were reviewed every 
year as a result of which the farmer was left in doubt and could 
not plan ahead. Take for example, the case of fertilizer. The 
rate of subsidy on it changed from year to year basis and at 
such a short notice that much of the expected impact was lost . 
In 1952-53, fertilizer was sold at a subsidy of 60%, in 1953-54, 
it was raised to 66% but in 1954-55, it was reduced to 50%. It 
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was again raised in 1955-56 to 66%. In 1956-57 and 1957-58, it 
was 66% in East Pakistan and 58% in West Pakistan. The rate was 
reduced to 40% in 1958-59 and this sudden lowering of the sub-
sidy gave a serious set-back to fertilizer consumption and "the 
imported fertilizers were lying in the government godowns in 
both the wings in large quantities" in 1959~l The thrust of the 
public policy during this period was on the purely engineering 
side of building new barrages and canals. The farmer was left 
alone to level and develop his land cheaply, in his own time and 
manner~2 ·; Beacuse of this attitude of general complacency and 
indifference of the government to them:·, most of the farmers 
lived at a bare subsistence level; their resultant apathy became 
identified with idleness. "The farmer himself has come to be 
looked down on as illiterate, of little importance to the 
country's economy-7311 says the Report,1960. In the political 
feild, the more vocal u~ban and upper classes attracted prior 
consideration and inf~ttie=-p_ublie esteem .tlrn __ ·political leaders: ' ( 
-' ~ 
we;re-" '!>reluctant, to-- accept- 1a portfolio_-_so -un::i:mporlaht· as agriculture . 
In the field of education, the purpose of being educated was to 
escape from being an illiterate person into a white collar job . 
In the curriculum, agriculture hardly mattered and as career 
o~jered neither power nor prestige. Students placed it at the 
bottom o,f the list .... with the result that by adverse selection, 
the quality of, the personnel entering the agriculture department 
was, with exceptions of course, generally of a lower level than 
that o~ othe.r servic~~t1 This low· status affected, in turn, the 
standing oj the department oj agriculture both among farmers 
and in the i~portant com,petitive battle for a share of the 
country's scarce ,finance. The numbers, pay and facilities accorded 
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to the staff from research at one end to a nebulous extension 
service at the other, suffered great disadvantages from this 
reputation for unimportance. Thus another cause of agricultural 
stagnation was the poor status accorded to the agricultural 
sector by the policy-makers . 
Let us now examine._· as to who were the policy makers? 
At thy time of independence, the provinces of Punjab, Sind and 
NWFP forming part oj Pakistan were dominated politically and 
economically by 80 landed families which together controlled 
nea;rly 3 million acres of land or one tenth of the total cul-
tivated a;reas oj West Pakistan and directly or indirectly were 
responsible ~o;r the livelihood of half a million households 1 ~ 
For a ye;ry sho;rt while after independence, the landed aristo-
c;racy ~·U;f,fered a tempo;rary loss during Jinnah - Liaqat period 
(194771951}. Addressing the annual meeting of the Karachi 
Chaiv.bep:; o;f CoJl)Ille;rce in Ap;ril 1948, Mohammad Ali Jinnah announ-
ced th_at 11r can no m,o,re vizualize a Pakistan without traders, 
than L can one w:;ithout cultiyators and civil servants". This 
meant that indu~t;ry, t;rade, agriculture and administrative 
appa:ratus, all were to be developed in a balanced manner. But 
owing to the meagre administrative capability, the government 
committed itself to public ownership in only three' groups of 
indust,r;ies: arms and a,mmuni tions of war; the generation of 
hyd,r,oelectrh:~ powe;r and the manu;f actu;re and operation of 
railways·, telephone, telegraph and wireless equipment. All the 
other sectors, including ag;riculture, were left almost to the 
complete ,f-;reedom o:f action of the private entrepreneur,s . 
Agricul tu:re, which under the B;ri tish enjoyed government patronage,;-; 
, 
now could not compete with the private entrepreneures led by 
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the ente;r;p;rising indu~t.r:;ial )I}.erchant class who had migrated 
j,-,ro)I}. Bo)I}.bay, and othe,r :relati-yely developed parts of India and 
susta:;ined a dete,rio;ration :Ln ter,ms of trade with other sectors~ 7 
With the death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah in September. 
~948 and assaspination o~ Liaqat Ali Khan, his successor, in 
October, -1951, a :major ;re-alignment of socio-political groups 
took place unde.r the leadership o,f Ghulam Mohammad, a public 
accountant turned politician, under which the landed aristfficracy 
was re-habilitated as an im,po;rtant element in the decision -
m,ak:;ing process. With the return of the landed class to the 
pol:;i tica,l arena,one could expect improvement in the agricul tur1al 
sector, but it continued to stagnate. The reason f©r this is 
agajn to be ,found in the set of policies adopted in the per:;iod._ 
I 
These policies favoured the large landlords' and 11 ~mi ted to the 
powerful bureaucracy 1' who felt comfortable with them1~ As the 
new political Psoci_al coalition" group consisted of a number of 
pol:;itical parties haying conflicting interests with no single 
group o;r individual able to dominate the economic and p0litical 
decision - m,aking, bureaucracy had to play the dominant role in 
policy ·making . 
The landlords, duly supported by the bureaucracy, 
ma.ximised their ;returns by adopting agricultural policies which 
suited them. For them, water, not land was the real constraint; 
they used theiT power and influence now to persuade the govern-
ment to ·extend_' the already very e:xtensive Indus Irrigation 
System. With tnc:rease in water, their typical response was · to 
"extend the acreage which in the past they left totally unused 
rather than to increase the water applied to the acreage they 
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were already cul ti vating 11~9 In doing this, they (i) benefitted 
by;-extensive ,rather-.thart~intensive cultivation and (ii) expanded 
their poJ.i ttteGtl tconsti::tuency ·'- The-· m0re.!Oland i they~: couitd"b:r1ing0 
under their control, the larger the nu~ber of their tenants and 
the large.r their consti tuency--and the greateiJT their political 
power. Evidence to this behaviour of the big landlords was provided 
after the imposition of EBDO (_Electoral Bodies (disqualification) 
order) by Ayub Khan in August, .1959 which applied to any·- person 
who had held any public office or position and was found guilty 
of ·misconduct while hold~ng that office. cSome.--::6(;)00 ;people,-.:· . _ 
"'labburea under the EBD0112? Of all big landlords as many as 40% 
were charged~nder the order. Of those so charged, nearly 80% 
were found to have used their official powers for either "dive.rt-
ing to their lands a higher proportion than was allowed by 
. b . . t" t 1121 ''f h . law and customs of ava1la le irr1ga ion wa er , or or c ang1ng 
the scope and extent of government sponsored irrigation schemes 
in such a way that a higher proportion than planned originally of 
new irrigartion- water- was made~' avaiil.able for use on their lands" 2~ 
This near monopolistic control of a scarce _resoµrce-·.for'.product-
jon increased the .aggregate.wealth of the landlords, but not the 
productivity of the land they cultivated because they applied 
e.:xten:?i:ye methods oj cul tiyation like increases in area under 
cultivation 1 Since the p,roductivity of the land did not increase, 
anq in some cases declined, the overall impact of the political 
retu;rn o;f the landed a;ristocracy was at best indifferent. The 
health ot the agr~cultural economy, therefore continued to de-
te;r±orate, as it is evident from table 2 . 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• ,. 
• 
• 
• 
'.• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
' 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
•· 
'.c··: 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
.,-36-
" 'CON CL 1JSTG>N • 
The first decade (1947-1958) of Pakistan was a 
decade of agricultural stagnat_ion. Public policies adopted 
dur:j_ng the period were the .major• causal factor of this 
stagnation. Private sector did not invest much in the agricultural 
sector partly because of the upheaval caused by the exchange 
o,:(' povulatiQn and partly because of the slow rates of return in 
agriculture whe:re the government deliberately kept the prices of 
,:('oodgra:inp 19w. The decline of the relative importance of agri-
culture in the National Economy was another cause. Another major 
causal factor was the bureaucratic controls on foodgrains and 
the rapid review of rates of subsidies due to which farmers 
could not plan ahead. But a more general and elaborate explana-
tion for the stagnation of agriculture in the 1950s can be 
sought through an inter-disciplinary approach. There were not 
only econOlI)ic, but social, political and administrative factors 
which caused stagnation. During 3innah - Liaqat period, agricul-
tural sector sustained deterioration because the government 
pat,:ronage enjoyed by it during the British period was withdrawn. 
D:u;vtng the social coalition :rule, landed aristocracy assumed a 
do.II)i,nant '.J'.'Ole and in collaboration with the bureaucracy, designed 
agrtcultural policies which paid little attention to increase 
agricultural p:roductiyity through intensive cultivation. Policies 
depigned to expand cul ti·yated area only enlarged the consti-
tuency 9,:(' the big landlords. -;F'o:r them, water and not land was 
a~ajo;v constratnt; they, as such, designed policies through 
which large scale investments we:re made in the public sector 
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for expanding the Indus Basin Irrigation System and got, in 
this way, the maximum benefit. The middle and the small farmers, 
who formed the bulk of the rural population, for lack of 
investment funds, suffered a drop in total productivity. However 
proclamation of Martial Law in 1958 by Ayub Khan produced a 
significant change which is discussed in the next chapter . 
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'CHAPTER:,_3 
.,,'(".;'REEN' REVOT_,'UTION 'i::" '1959:...1971 
- - -- -- -- -
The overall economic performance of Pakistan during these 
13 years - 1959-1971 - of Pakistan's history was quite encouraging . 
The economy of West Pakistan grew rapidly during the Second 'Five Year 
Plan (1960-1965), with GDP increasing at 6,6% per annum. This high 
growth rate was spea·rheaded by an industrial gTowth of 13 .1% per annwn 
However, agriculture grew by only 3.7% per annum. Pakistan's overall 
econo;nic growth slowed somewhat dur;Lng the Third ·Five Year Plan (1965-
1970 l to about 6% per annum, The ±ndustrial growth rate fell to 7.6% 
but agr±cultural output grew at 5.6% annually with the aid o;f new 
high yielding varteties o;f wheat and rice varieties, reducing, but 
not eliminating, the food deficit. The wajor set-back was experienced 
by the agricultural secto,r in 1965-67 when it yielded growth rates o;f 
2.00% and 0.9% in these 2 years. However increased emphasis on a~ri­
culture in the revised development plan,improved its performance.1 
"The overall crop production- index (1951-52 =lOO)jumped from 128 in 
1964-1965 .to 186 in 1969-70.The productivity indices of food,non-
food, and filrre crops gained 57, 19, and 55 percent age points respect-
ively during the same period. This sudden upward shift in crop 
productivity occurred because of the rap~d adoption of new farm 
technologies - improyed crop~- varieties, fertilizer, tube-well irriga-
tion, pesticides and tactors'.'. Table 3 (1) and 3(2 )overleaf provide 
"·Rate of Economic Progress" I and. ''Real growth rat~s"during this period . 
Let 11s explore below the underlying causes for this rapid expansion 
and the role of government policy in the success of the "green 
I 
revolution'' . 
The process of perpetuation of the political power of the 
landed arist0cracy was still going on in Pakistan (as mentioned in 
chapter 2) when Ayub Khan proclaimed Martial Law in October, 1958. 
Ayub Khan belonged to a rural-based middle-class farming family of 
Hazara district (now Di vision). His rise, therefore, "exemplified 
the emergence of the rural middle classes as a powerful group in 
Pakistan's poli tics3". Using the cover of Martial Law ( 1958-62). he 
introduced land reforms in 1959. "that were aimed at reducing the 
power of the landed arist@cracv4". The not so very radical land re-
forms produced an important political and psychological impact. The 
ceilings introduced on landholdings were liberal and loopholes many. 
Landlords could still own about 2000 acres of irrigated and 4000 acres 
of non-irrigated land if they transferretl some of their property to -
their legal hE(irs and converted some other into orchards, nurseries 
and game reserve;i~. They could continue to evict tenants if they 
failed to pay rent or cultivate land with a certain degree of 
efficiency. 2.3 million acres~of land were directly affected by the 
reforms, and of these 930,000 acres consited of_wastes, hills and 
river beds5. An irr.portanf criticism of land reforms of 1959 has be,en 
provided by L~slie Nulty. She says: 
" ....... 5064 landowners declared excess land. On average, the declared 
excess per owner was 1445 acres. Land was actually acquired by the 
government from only 763 of the ,declarers,, and only 55% of the declared 
excess land was acquired by the government for distribution ....... it 
may be assumed that the remaining 45% of the total excess land stayed 
wit~ its owners. After surrendering their declared excess land, the 
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' TABLE ·3·c;1) 
Rates of growth of 1949/50 ~ 1959/60 
to to 
.1,9.59/6.0. ' .196.4.j.65 
Gross Domestic Product 2.7 6.6 
Population 2.4 3.0 
. Per. Cap.Lta. JnCQIIJe.,. . . . , ... , 0 .. ,3. , , . .3 ... 6 
1964/65 
to 
.1969/70 
7.9 
3.1 
.4. 8 
Source: Shahid Javed Burki, " Pakistan under 
Bhutto - 197.1-77" New York, St . 
Martin's Press, 1980, P-44 . 
. TABLE 3{2) 
' 'RE'AL' GROWTH 'RATES' '('PERCENTAGES l 
-----~- - - -
1949/50 1959/60 1969/10 
to to to 
1959/60 1969/70 1976/77 
GDP at factor cost 3.1 6 .8_ 3.0 
Population 2.5 2.9 3.0 
GDP per Capita 0.6 3.8 0.0 
Agriculture 1.6 5.0 1.7 
Industry 7.8 9.9 1.6 
Services. 4.0 4.4 4.1 
Source: Ibid. P-165. 
1969/70 
to 
1974/75 
3.0 
3.0 
0.0 
~---
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763 owners were each left, on average, with 2100 acres and 
Rs . .120,,000 in compensation"6. In .total, Nulty reports, 2.2 million 
acres were acquired by the government .. Of this-1/4th were areas 
unfit foT culti>Vation, and of the remaining 1.64 million acres, 
just under one half was classified cultural waste which would 
require conside-rable investment to bring it under the plough. Nulty 
concl-udes that "from the point of view of agricultural productivity 
and output, this attempt at land reform does appear to have awakened 
the interest of formerly absentee landlords in running their land 
on more commercial lines, largely out of fear that their tenants 
mi·gl'it otherwise be accorded proprietary rights to the land. Aside 
~;rom this indirect influence, the generous provisions and the 
limited extent of their implementation the reforms has had only 
II)arg:tnal, if any, effect on the traditional system of land tenure"7 . 
rt t':~ gene.rally accepted by Qther:wr;:i-:t~:ns-~ 1ike Shafiitl Burki8& Nic.holson.;9 
that the 1959 land reforms had little direct ir,rpact on the redis-
tribut:i:on o:f;' land. / 
Other agricultural policies, besides land reform, adopted 
by tbe Ayub than :regime can be broken down into 3 basic components:-
(±)_ Price Policy (_ii)_ Public investment in infra-structure and 
(iit')_ c·;red:j:t policy. Let us examine each in turn . 
Prtce policy in West Pakistan was reviewed by Ayub Khan 
regtII)e that turned the terms o,f trade in favour of the agricultural 
sector. Many of the controls, referred to in chapter 2, were 
abolished in 1960. The administration now guaranteed farmers a 
II)in:tmuII) p·rice of Rs. 13. 50 per maund ( 82. 3 pounds or about 37. 5 Kgs) 
of wheat. Sales ·to the gover-nment were voluntary, and the Food 
depaTt~ent entered usual maTket channels only when prices dipped 
below the statutory mi'nimum10. The net result of these changes was 
an increas in the price the farmers could get Ojr expect to get for 
thei·r surplus wheat. Other commodities whose minimum price was 
gua:ranteed were suga-r-cane, cotton and rice (For West Pakistan,: these 
are cash crops). The prices of these four commodities (_including 
wheat t seem to haye 0-een regulated throughout the period under 
cons~de;ration, These minimum ·,fixed pTices were, however, consider-
al'Hy lower than the world prices. By 1973 the prices had crept upto 
Rs, 46 per maund for the best grades of rice and Rs. 20 per maund 
,:fQ;t? wbeat, The 'Far Easte·:rn Economic 'Review, in its issue of April 
24, 19 74 (_P-55) reported that this price amounting to $ 70 per ton 
for coarse rice and $ 112 for fine rice when procurred on a com-
pulsory levy in 1973-74 was sold at $ 225 and $ 470 a ton on the 
world market. The result of the policy of guaranteeing minimum 
prices of foodgrains, introduced by the Ayub reg~me and continued 
by the successive governments has been that the prices in Pakistan 
(o,f foodgrains) have been considerably lower than the world prices . 
But guaranteeing such lower prices of foodgrains was compensated by 
subsidies on fertilizer and other key inputs. The government of 
Ayub Khan regime subsidized fertilizer and other inputs and made 
credit as easily available as possible in order to encourage private 
investment in the rural sector in such improvements as tubewells to 
supplement irrigation. The fertilizer subsidy bill for the year 
1969-70, for example, was Rs.11.2 crores ($ 11.3 million)ll. And a 
provision of Rs. 318 million for both West and East Pakistan was 
made in the Second Five Year Plan (1960-65) for the distribution of 
fertilizers and manures, and to meet the cost of subsidy.12-These 
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policies were a part of the "incenti-ve strategy" of the government . 
Analysis by Nulty13 and Stephen Lewis14 indicate that the terms of 
trade between the ur~an and rural sectors remained fairly stable and 
slightly in favour of agriculture during the decade of the 60- s . 
Thus government expenditures in prolI)otion of agriculture, in subsidies 
and building up of infra-structure in rural areas appears to have 
roughly balnaced by the controlled prices of foodgrains which were 
considerably lower than the world markets . 
Leslie Nulty, however, questions the whole rationale of the 
so ca,lled "incentive strtegy" of the Ay,ub ,regime15. F:t:rst poorly 
developed and poo,rly regulated markets, she says, tended to dampe·11i 
the interaction between 11 incentive prices 11 a_nd farm behaviour by 
reducing th_e amount of the incentive that actually reached the farmer . 
Second, once the farmer achieves self.,..sufficiency in- grain production, 
he is more likely to respond to prices by changing the composition of 
his output than by increasing production. Third, the advantages 
of a tubewell and of the new- seed~ a;re s0 great that they would be 
ad0pted regardless of price shifts within fairly wide ranges.Fourth, 
the distribution of acreage between cash crops and irain i.e . 
between summer and winte·r crops is not determined by price, even 
:after increases,_of procU>relI)ent prices in 1967-68, but by the·'availability 
of water, She concludes that the government price policy cannot be 
construed to be a conscious attempt to improve real agricultural in-
come 11 although the consequent; response of agricultural output 
to what was assumed tq bP a favourable constellation of prices has 
in part been used as an ex-.post indication of success that justifie(:? 
past policies" 11 16 . 
This type o;:e reasoni'1g m,aylead_ one to a lot of controversy-
There can be no doubt that the success of the ll)arket strate:gy and 
incentive strategy depended on a rational farm population which 
was highly price sensitivesQperhaps this is why it was particularly Punjabs 1 
medi-um and larger farmers category, who"reaped the ·main bene,fi ts 
from the inc-reased income~! l 7It is also c~ear that :j.:t is the 
adequately trrigated areas o;f Punjab that provided bulk of this 
increased productivity\. 11Thus· there is a)I)ple eyidence f;ro)I) ?unjab-----
that the incentive strategy can be highlv,effective but produces 
somewhat severe class and regional dispmrities'..tlS Ay.ubregi)I)e b@..Sically 
adopted a permissive policy which remove1d constraints and pe,Tmi tted 
farm,ers with resources to employ those recou;rces more effectively. 
This policy no doubt, succeeded with the help of the already existing 
entrepreneurial talent; re.dources and investments but it is basically 
the public policy which exploited those rooources. In the sca:rcity 
environmentof the 50sJ and 60s, the governmen~s strategy was. a 
policy oriented towards rapid exp1-nsi0'!'.1 of maTketed ,foodgrains and 
export c0mmodities like cottt0n. After thP ab0lition of the village 
aid programme in 1958 until the initiation of the integrated ,rural 
development programme in 1972, the Pakistan government could hardly 
be said to have had a rural development or gr0wth with justice 
prograTIUiles . 
The most successful aspect of the public policy during this 
period was the expansion of public investment in rural infrastructure-
roads, irrigation, land reclamation etc. E~tensive government efforts 
proved effective in 'fighting the problem of water-logging and 
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salinity and at least 1450000 acres of land that had been uncultivatable 
:were brought into production.Additionally soil conservation efforts 
helped in checking soil arosion and between 1964-65 and 1969-70 an 
area of· 195000 acres was recovered and brought under production. 
The worlds largest irrigation netwo'rk was further ffinlarged by 
constructing new dams and barrages and small scale irrigation dams in 
the mountainous regions. These undertakings, together with the net-
work of n2w canals and distributaries consumed Rs.6458 million out of 
the total public sector development alloctions of Rs.25147 million in 
the thirP. five year plan (1965-70) .ln return, the nation had additional 
supplies of 3.5. million acre Yeet (MAF) of irrigation water and 20210 
KWH uni'ts of electricty. New irrigation supplies brought into cultivatio11 
an additional area:_. of 2720000. acres. The local governmen±s contributed 
Rs.4598400 out of a total of Rs.28740000 for some 8690 local irrigation 
projects during the period of 1963-64 to 1963-69. 19 
The public sector ~lso attendej to the colonisation of new 
area~, particularly in the province of Sind and in the Third Plan 
period generated 5.7 million acres of farm land. The settlement on the 
newly opend up areas was accomplished through government efforts which 
included, besides revenue remissions and subsidised inputs, the pro-
vision of heavy earth-moving equipment, tractor-tillage facilities and 
technical advice. However, inspite of all these efforts, only 20% of 
the 200 million acres of potentially arable land was brought under the 
plough and the a-verage cropping intensity for the farm< - economy as a 
whole just approached the 100% level. The major gains of the green 
revolution occured not in these areas"/Jut in the more intensively 
farmed and older settlements of the Punjab"20. According to Nulty' s 
findings, these efforts did serve to arrest a declinin~ man/land ratio 
and might have had some impact on rural land pressures. ~1 
AgricultuTal Credit in this period has appeared as a major 
constraint on the green revolution. The modern agricultural technology 
is, in theory, neutral to scale, but it is not neutral so far as the 
access to inputs is concerned. Small farmers, without access to credit, 
find it difficult to buy fertilizer or to invest in the all important 
tubewell. Studies conducted on the "green revolution" reveal that the 
major part in its promotion was played by private initiative; public 
sector's contribution to it, by way of agricultural credit, was minimal . 
This can be illustrated by promotio~ of water supply for irrigation. 
Nulty reports that by 196 3, there were 16280 tubewells in West Pakistan 
and only 22% of these were drilled by the government. The remainder had 
been installed by newly emerging private companies22. The wells began 
to expand first in Sialkot and Gujranwalla districts in the Punjab 
where the cost was low due to the high water table and availability of 
electricity, which obviously depended on the government sanctioning 
electric connections. But owing to difficulties involved in getting 
electric connections, some farmers used diesel pumps, though they were 
more expensive and less efficient to run. Thus the exp·ansion in water 
supply occurred in and was financed primarily by the private sector in 
this period. In West Pakistan the exp®1.sion of the new technology -
seeds, fertilizers, acreage and incre~ses in yield etc - are directly 
related to and dependent upon the increases in the supply of irrigation 
water23. Thus the success of the new varieties was in those areas and 
among those farmers who had assuired and controlled supplies of water. 
The importance of irrigation water was illustrated in 1970-71 when · 
Pakistan's agriculture experienced a negative growth rate owing to natl 
rains and the inadequate supply of water in the canal system. Wheat 
production fell 11%, rice by 8% and sugarcane by 12%. 24 
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The co-operatives played· a central role in the government'~ 
strategy of supplying credit to the rural sector. We have dealt 
with the co-operatives as an institution in chapter I. Here it can 
only be re-iterated that the contribution of co-operatives to the 
economic salvation of the rural sector was, by and large, dismal 
except for scattered and rare cases. "The numerical expansion of 
co-operatives and the inclusion of more and more activities into 
the domain of these organisations occurred, but with little result25~ 
The overall performance of the co-operative sector during Ayub 
regime in promoting agricultural development is reflected in the 
fact that the Bhutto government had to promulgate a Martial Law 
Order to :recover outstanding payments from members and executives 
of more than Rs.300 million and to initiate a complete overhaul of 
these institutions . 
Fertilizer and pesticides production received sizeable 
allocations from the regime during this period. The joint efforts of 
the publtc and private sectors added additional production capicity 
of 37574 tons of nitrogenous and phosphatic fertilizers. The per-
formance of the public sector in the distribution of these key inputE 
was weak; however the urban-based commercial and industrial entre-
freneurs were encouraged by the government to establish their 
effectiveness by reaching distribution points and they reached as 
deep as "the small market towns and important transport crossings 
which, in turn, linked up with the individual farmers-'.26rhese ent re-
Preneur~ relied for the most part on the existing institution of 
rnqrket j,unctionartes, thereby accomplishing their task without much 
add:j:tional social cost in terms of institutional infra-structure . 
Prom,otton of agro-based industries during the period 
19657 70 occurred -:rpainly through the initiative of private entre-
prenurs as well. The private sector undertook marketing of farm inputs 
and cont~nued also the age~old functions of merketing of farm 
products. Except for the procurement of foodgrains during periods of 
nqt:fonal em,e,rgency and the -marketing by sugarcane marketing co-
OJ?e.ratt·yes of approximately 20% of the sugarcance produced, the 
J;'em,a:j:_ning marketable farm surpluses found their way to processing 
plant~ and consun;iers, both local and foreign, through the private 
m,arkettng functionaries. In the area of credit facility, AgriculturaJ 
Deyelopment Bank of Pakistan, the co-operatives and the Revenue 
Department (which granted taccavi crop loans) managed to capture 
only 12% share in the total credit supplied in this period. The 
priyate s~ctor, embodied in market functionaries and village shop -
keepers, emerged as the major source of cash and in-kind credit for 
the green 1·evolution. 27 
The private sector manufactured domestically only a few 
simple replacement parts of tractors and other farm machinery, but 
its performance i_n the manufacture of tube-well engines and related 
components was e~ensi ve. According to Falcon28, "towns where it was 
imposible to buy the proverbial pot in the mid 50 s had by 196~ 
become centres of diesel engine and pump manufacture': In contTast 
the government supported co-operative·· Karkha'na·-·e-A:l'at-e-Zari. 
(Bahawalpur), which was expected to become- a leading concern in the 
wanufacture of -modern farm implements suited to local Pakistani 
condi_tions, became a model of misappropriation of public funds and 
inefficient resource use . 
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It is manifest from the above discuision that it was 
generally the permissive atmosphere of the Ayub regime which per-
mitted the progressive farmers to respond to the green revolution. 
In most of the cases, the revolution was brought by the farmers 
themselves; by the progressive middle class farmers with fairly 
adequate resources, who were enabled to employ those resources 
more effectively by the permissive nature of the agricultural policy . 
The government limited its role mainly to the creation of infra-
structure . 
But there are some other social and political explanations 
of the green revolution. We have seen that the 1959 land reforms had 
an insignificant impact in reducing the economic and political power 
of the landed ~~isticracy, but they had a great psychological impact 
on it. Ayub also put 'imsf 9f 1the lhg landlords behind the bars~ under 
EBDO. In this way, he made it possible to banish them from the 
policy making arena at least temporarily. Ayub also took steps to 
reduce the power of the bureaucracy by retiring 37 senior civil 
servants compulsorily. Their power on the economic life of the 
country was also reduced by Ayub Khan by removing the elaborate sys-
tem of controls that had been created in the 1953-58 period. After 
taming: the landed aristicracy and bureaucracy in this way, Ayub 
devised an elaborate system of Basic Democracies in 1959 "which was 
designed to bring the middle class farmer in the decision making 
arena11 .29 
Briefly the Basic Democracies was a hierarchicalsystem of 
_fourtie)fs of non-political representative councils. The primary rural 
unit wa~ the uni0n council with jurisdiction over about 8000 to 
10000 people. The tehsil council, at the next' level included all the 
elected union council chairmen within its jurisdiction1 and an equal 
number of appointed members. under the chairmanship of the Tehsildar 
or sub-divisional officer. The district and divisional councils, 
under the chairmanship of Deputy Commissioner and Commissioner res-
pectively were made up of equal number of offcials and non-officials, 
some of the latter drawn from among union chairmen.30 
The actual functions of the councils were the revenue 
collection, law and order, agricultural and community development 
and to carry on local government. The union councils also assisted 
in the concilation and settlement of disputes in the villages. The 
regul~r courts came into the matter only if concilation failed or in 
criminal case~ if the controlling authority (D.C. or Tehsildar) or 
the concilation court itself felt that the interests of justice 
required a normal trial.31 
The fact which contributed to the unpopularity of the 
Qa~tc democracies system was the decision to have the elected 
counctllo;rs serye as electors for national and provincial offices. 
On ·J;i'eb;ru~;ry J-4, -1960, the newly elected cquncillors participated in 
a ;referendum e~pressing confidence in President Ayub's government. 
This p~ecedent was followed in the constitution of 1962, which 
limited the f~anchise for presidential and legislative electors to 
members of ari electoral college made up of the elected Basic 
democ~ats: This very_~act_of linkin~ memberships in the local 
council with the legI£latiye franchrse destroyed the local orien-
tation of the b~sic democracies and caused downfall of the system.32 
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' ' 
The elections of 1959 to the local councils held und~r 
the B.D. system "brought a large number of middle class ~armers 
into the political arena"33. Once they were there, they exerted their 
influence on the civil bureaucracy and the civil bureaucracy, in 
turn, re-consolidated its position by aligning itself more closely 
with this new social group"34. The middle class farmer, in the 
changed economic social, and political environment could now operate 
free of the control of the landed aristicracy and became the. 
economic maximizer. Shahid Javed Burki finds evidence in the data 
collected by him from the survey of 27 villages in the Punjab which 
shows that the middle class farmers,owning between 50 and 100 acres 
of land, increased their production most rapidly in 1959 and early 
60 s. They did this first by going in for intensive use of water,and 
then'--by ;-quickly_: adopting~ the-:''ttechndlogy ·ma:de ~-avail al:::lTe to them as a 
result of a breakthrough in the development of HYVS seed.· Burki, on 
the basis of this data, concludes that while the green revolution in 
the. developing world-was_ thought li:o~begin··in the irid-60s,,:in West Pakistan, 
it began with irrigation water, more than half a decade before the 
so-called green revolution (that ts in 1959/1960). This response of 
the middle class farmer to increaseagricultural productivity co-
incided w~th his emergence as a new powerful and independent factor _ 
in the political system of Basic democracies. The birr landlord in the 
·:J.950s _treated water as a scarce· resoUJ?ce.- As he _(.thed'n±ddle:_·class:1Aariner) 
did not have access to the vast tracts of waste-land available a 
decade earlier to the big landlords, he concentrated his attention 
on maximizing his benefit by installing tube-wells for irrigation.35 
On the basis of this fact we have ample evidence to conclude that 
one principal determinant of change in the agricultural sector of 
West Pakistan from the state of stagnation to the stage of prosperity 
was a new group of middle class agricultural entrepreneurs who was 
able to exercise influence over the formulation of public policy. 
This influence was exercised not only because the policy makers 
became aware of the potential power of this group, but also because 
in a number of cases the policy-makers themselves wer~ the members 
of this class. Public policy provided fertilizers and pesticides and 
other key inputs at subsidized prices. Tubewell parts were imported 
at favourable terms of exchange; energy for the tube wells was made 
available by the state run WAPDA (Water and Power Development 
Authority), at subsidized rates36. Big landlords and smrull farmers 
also seem to have gained increases in production, but largely the 
small farmer sustained deterioration in income. The new class of 
agricultural entrepreneurs brought into being by the Ayub regime, 
later on, turned itself into a group of political as well as 
economic maximiser and in doing so, followed the model provided by 1, 
the old landed aristicracy. This class might have increased conflict 
which existed in the rural set-up of Pakistan - a conflict between a 
big lan~lord and the middle class farmer or between a big landlord 
and his tenant. And this conflict must have contributed to the poli-
tical awakening of the rural masses which was clearly seen in the 
anti-Ayub movement in 1968-69 and in 1970 general elections and later 
on in the Bhutto period . 
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CONCLUSION . 
Pakistan achieved 54% increase in the average total pro-
duction of cereals within 10 years of the Green ·Revolution period, 
that is from 196.1 to 1970. This increase (excepting increases 
achieved by Tanzania (72%) and Jamaica (57%) in cereals in this P~riod)~was the highest in the world:3'7Pakistan' s Punjab broke 
"international agricultural records through very rapid rates of 
growth in wheat production38". This outstanding achievement was 
made possible by the Ayub regime by introduction of reforms in the 
pricing policies of foodgrains and cash crops. The role played by 
the land refoTms and agricultural credit policies was, however, 
insignificant. The reforms in the pricing policies, common~YT 
called the "incentive strategy" of the government were highly 
effective but produced somewhat severe class and regional dispari-
ties, ":incTeased rural conflict" and caused "considerable uncer-
tainty about future agricultural development39".(_We shall examine 
this aspect of green revolution in chapter 5 onwards) . 
Ayub regime basically adopted a permissive agricultural 
policy wh~y~ removed many governmental constraints on the agricul-
tural development which permitted many progressive middle class 
farmers with fairly adequate resources, to employ those resources 
more effectively. During this revolutionary period a large propor-
:tion of farmers in all size categories appear to have obtained some 
absolute incTease in production thTough the widespread adoption of 
the high yielding rice and wheat seeds, but the major beneficiaries 
green revolution were the newly emerging middle class and large 
farmers. The government played its role in the infra-structure 
creation (and poli,cy formation) like expansion of transportation 
facilities, provis\on of some of the key inputs, but the major role 
in the economics of' the green revolution was played by the private 
sector . 
Ayub devised an elaborate system of Basic democracies in 
order to transfer s0,me of the political, social and economic power 
to the middle class farmers which, in turn, provided (i) legitimacy 
to the regime and (ii) rapid agricultural development . 
Bureaucracy weakened temporarily regained its powe·r and 
control in the economic life of the country by aligning itself with 
the newly emerging middle landownd.ng, ~. class~ Landed aristicracy 
weakened psychologically" was brought back to influence (not to control 
decision making with the promulgation o~ 1962 constitution, but 
this time, the big landlord had to compete; with the middle class 
landowner, civil and military bureaucracy, merchant-industrialist 
and small industrial producers. The 1962 constitution permitted 
very little power to these decision-influenc~ys. It was very dif~ 
ficult to satisfy everyone's interests in this broad-based ruling 
coalition. The economic slowdown after the 1965 war with India 
brought to surface the grievences and conflict existing between 
various social groups in the rural areas which ultimately brought 
Ayub's fall in 1969 and another period of instability and adverse 
economic conditions staTted . 
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Stagr:iation Dies hard - 1971-1977 
The economic programme during the Ayub period produced rapid growth 
but relatively little gain at the lower end of the income distribution scale. The 
grievances of the groups who suffered from this disparity surfaced in mid-1967 
in anti-Ayub movement, which turned violent in November 1968 and continued till 
March, 1969. On March 25, 1969, Ayub-YlVas forced out of office by General >rahya 
Khan. Anti-Ayub movement, which originated from west Pakistan, brought to 
surface Bengali grievances over the distribution of-national resources. This 
conflict led to the populari~y of Sheikh Muj ib-ur-Rahman' s Awam i League and 
his six points which sought economic independence of East Pakistan and was, therefore, 
i:mmediately rejected by the leadership in the West Pakistan. Awami League's 
triumph in the 1970 general elections and itsGb.im, to power ir) the e_arly months of 1 S71 
and its insistence on the acceptance of 6 points f~rmula ended in a b4tter conflict 
which resulted in the secession of East Pakistan and the emergence of Bangladesh 
as an independent state in December, 1971 .1 . 
On 20 December, 1971, the interim military regime of Yahya Khan handed 
over power to Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, the Chairman of the Pakistan People's Party(PPP)" 
The elections of 1970 had provided Bhutto with a broad economic and political 
mandate in the Punjab and S ind provinces of West Pakistan . 
With the political dtstal'.1bances and the separation of EastPakistan from West 
Pakistan, the country's economy unde~went severe changes during 1971 and 1972. 
Trbi<S~\'l·«as also partly caused by the prolonged drought that virtually halted the increase 
in agricultural output. For the 2 years, 1971 and 1972, agriculture shoyved "- ., -
increase of less than O. 5% but increase of about 3. 1 % in 1973 and 1974 .Maroqf~@~ring ;.. 
value- added fell by more than 3% over the 2 years, 1971 and 1972, but then ro-se 
about 5.5% in 1973 and about 8% in 1974. From 1970 to 1977 GDP growth rate was on' J 
average 3% per annum and the population growth rate was 3% per annum. There was ;thu 
hardly any improvement in per capita incomes. Owing to the loss in real incomes 
because of the adverse movem e1t of the international terms of trade, per capita 
real incomes actually declined. Per capita commodity production declined 
markedly. Agricultural growth .. -:-~tes were, in fact, 1. 7% per annum, significantly belo'v'· 
the rate of population increase (See ... T.ab(e .3~2t):tn-Chhpf 9r 3).~ · · ·)r _-\ 
, \ 
Pakistan's economy operated in adverse conditions in this period- and 
demonstrated its strength and resilience , both in its adjustments to the separation 
of the 2 wings in 1971 and in its absorbing of the shocks of drought in 1972, of 
F loads in the summer of 1973 and of the increase in international petroleum prices 
in October, 1973 • 
-;:ito G. T. Brown, Eastern Wings separation had a favourable iinrpact on 
Pakistan's agriculture's terms of trade, for after its separation, a substantial part 
of trade was diverted to world markets."This reflected both a sharp jump (about 
1/3rd) in the size of the cotton crop and in the exports of cotton and cotton texti.l~s, 
and the successful diversion to other markets of most of the.flow of cotton, textt les, 
rice and other goods with which West Pakistan had pre-viously re- imbursed 
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East Pakistan for its flow of jute and jute earnings to West Pakistan':r ~z.:2,.:·':-0--,- .• 
.But according to a study of the Ministry of Commerce, 57% of increase 'i 
in exports in the years 1970-72 was due to quantity increases, 25% due to higher 
prices and only 18% due to diversion from East Pakistan to the world markets .3 
For purposes of discussing politics of de;:ision r:iaking in the agricultural , 
sector, Bhutto regime may be divided into 2 phases. First phase (1972 - October 1974. 
is characterised by the ascent of the left. In this phase, a number of reforms were 
introduced by the regime primarily on ideological rather than on political basis• 
The protagonists in this phase, besides Bhutto, were the ultra-lefthsts like 
Mubashir Hasan ( the Finance Minister), J.A. Rahim, (Minister for Production) 
and the rural leftists like Sh. Rashid. In plhase 2 ( Oct.1974 - July 1977), Bhutto 
brought back all the old established landlords, bureaucrat©o:. and the.::r.i~ght-l-·':..-1"'= _,,-·ted 
oriented politicians in the de-eision - making arena.4 ' 
The swiftness with which the ultra leftist government chose to nationalize 
31 large firms in 10 basic industries in January 1972 was a manif~statio~ of the 
idea logical content of the po lie ies adopted in the first phase. if he. tndu~tr1es affected 
by this decision involved iron and steel-,basic metals, heavy engtneertng, motor 
vehicle assembly and manufacturing, tractor assembly and minufactu_re, heavy and 
basic chemicals petrochemicals, cement and publ.ic utilities. A p~r1od of ~1reat . " 
uncertainty follo~ed. wtionalization. The private s_ec;:t~r which had e~hilbited a ':. ")"\ --:;. :.1c 
tremendous amount/a>ynamism during the 1960 in b,P:it'.(gm_tjabout the green revolution was 
confused about the real inter.1:Ubr.lSJOf the government and the administration was not 
inclined to provide concerete assurances to it. Consequently, there was a sharp 
decline in savings and investment. In 1970, the nation had sr;i.yed J3~3% of its, wealth, 
put this declined to 8. 4% in 1972. Investment by private ent'.repreneur,:-esin 1972 
"declined to 5.4:.% fnom 8.5% in 1970. At 5.4%, private inves;tment was just sufficient 
to offset the de'i;reciation of the existing stock of machinery and capital and nothing 
was being inve~ted for the sake of the futureP-
Bhutto regime d_id,not neglect the farm sector. Land Reforms were introduced 
in March, 1972 which ha§ had'bnly marginal impact on the pattern of landholding and 
little short -r.:iam effect oA development'.7 Under its provisioni;; ,irrigated !holdings of more 
than 150 acres per owner and non-irrigated holdings of more than 300 acres per owner, 
were to be surrendered to the state without compensation for redistribution to landless 
and small farmers. These reforms compared with limits of 500 and 1000 acres per 
owner in the 1959 land reform. The limits were on an individual owner basis • 
However, the effective household ownership of much larger areas was possible. 
The par-celling out of land to wives, dhHdren and other close relations had already 
oCCll!t':t'e:Ci in anticipation of such a reforn;;;~nd much of the land taken over was of 
relatively little value. More importan·t were the provisions requiring landlords to 
pay all taxes and water rents and half the costs of fertilizer, seeds, and other 
inputs. The landlord'~ share of the crop was fixed to 50% and tenants could not be 
evicted as long as they{ tilled the land and paid their rents. Tenants were also given 
first rights to the purchase of the land they cultivated • 
" Enforcement of these provisions was however difficult,6hly a i'landful of formal 
actions against landlords were brought to court, ,t11;ough complaints about 
continuing evictions, exces?ive rents, and other landlord violations of the reform' s 
provisions were num.erous:8Nevertheless the law strengthened the 19hyeh:ological 
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. ·_position of tenants and made many landlords more cauti011s about removing 
"' or exploiting them • 
Other important reform.s introduced in the agricultural sector 
in the first phase were the imposition of various government controls on 
procurement prices of agricultural commodities, export dubes and export 
restrictions. Public sector substantially invested in improving irrigation and 
drainage facilities and in controlling salinity. About one billion dollars (at 1973 
prices) were proposed-to be spent in irrigation improvement, drainage and flood 
control for 1975-79 of-which the water-logging and salinity control components were a. 
about$ 320 million. Export duties and bans and the government monopoly of raw 
cotton and rice exports lk-ef"l'.llt domestic prices of many agricultural commodities 
far below world market levels. Take, for example, the case of cotton. In 1971 
cotton exporlB'were transferred from the non bonus to the 10% export bonus list, 
raising the exchange rate for its export from Rs.4. 76 per dollar to about Rs.5. 7 
per dollar. At the time of the May 1972 devaluation of the Pakistan rupee (from 
US 21 cents to US 9 cents per rupee), raw cbtton was one of 10 commodities on 
which export duties were imposed. (specific exps ort duties were also imposed on 
cottoA vyaste, cotton yarn, grey cloth at decreasing levels, raw hides and skins, 
semi-tcn1ned and tanned hides and skins, rice, oil cakes and raw wool). The 
export duty on raw coUon was set at 35% giving exporters~Rs. 7.17 per dollar 
rather than the official rate of Rs. 11 per dollar. In Spetember 1972, the export duty 
on raw cotton was raised to 40% that is giving exporters Rs.6.6 per dollar • 
Devaluation of the dollar in February, 1973 lowered the exchange rate by 10% 
to Rs.9.9 per dollar. In June, 1973 the export duty on raw cotton was-raised to 45% ,-l 
plus an additional 30% on any excess of the price over Rs.1500 per,Q~le~-As a result 
the average exchange rate on raw cotton exports in 1974 was only about Rs.4.6 
per dollar. Because of export duties on rice and its monopoly of rice exports, the 
government received about 75% of the price of Basmati rice exports in 1974, implying 
an exchange rate of about Rs. 2. 7 per dollar if compared with an official rate since 
devaluation of the U.S. dollar in February 1973 of Rs.9.9 per U.S. dollar.9 
Despite these heavy rates of taX•ation, 'prices of cotton and rice within the coun-
try rose. The average price received'by farmers per ma-und of seed cotton rose 
from Rs.50 in 1972 to Rs.60 in 1973 and Rs.90 in 1974. The procurement pri~e for 
Basmati rice was Rs.46 per maund in 1973, Rs.62 in 74 and Rs. 90 in 1975~?Aside 
from its great need for revE?riues, the government's dilemma with agricultural 
prices was between l;etting f1arm prices rise higher to encourage production and 
limiting farm price increases in order to hold down increases in the cost of living. 
Lower farm prices also helped reduce the government deficit by provid.~g g~eater 
potential and actual government revenues from export duties ard by reducing 
government expenditures to subsidize the sale of Frsheat through ration shops. The 
procurement price of wheat was increased from/17 per maund in 1972 to Rs. 25. 5 
in 1974. Retail ration shop atta (wheat flour)prices were equal to the procurement 
price plus the fee paid for milling, with the government absorbing all handling and 
distribution costs. At Rs. 2q~5 o.er manud, farmers received the rupee equivalnet 
1-~ ' uurtng 
rr-' r~"' of about$ 69 per ton, while(nearly half of the 1974, ration shop supply ltad been 
·~/ imported at prices near$ 200 per ton. Thus the government was paying higher 
•same prices to Amercian and Candian farmers than the Pakistani farmers4-1That idfference 
3u9sis!,~zect,.,0 had been a drain on s~arce budget resources, since all imported wheat had been 
.-ice as~ •r,,. r-
:f omest ic . ' b.-:ooug~ for cash or on credits not exceeding 3 years and sold through ration shops 
~eat. Thus at the/ultra left PPP govt. was spending a lot of money on food subsidy. The Pakistani :e farmer was only receiving the controlled price ~fw~ge~e'A'hich was far below the world 
market prices. Obviously, "the urban consumer"/proving to be a drain on government's 
e, scarce resources. Burki finds evidence that there was a strong urban ibias in the vari-
• ous farm policies adopted by the leftist regime of ppp durinq the flrc::t- nh;::i,..,., 
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The left:s principal interest was to"ensure the supply of Agricultoral commodities 
and processed goods to its constituencies in the Urban Areas at equitable prices·~ 
The Government was prepaa,re.d: to intervene massively in the marketing system 
whenever prices rose by amounts that were considered to .b~ unreasonable'.'12 
The government first d:ntervened in the autumn of 1972' when the prices of sugar, 
because of short supply, more than doubled in a period of less than three months . 
The government now establlshed a two-market system under which the Urban 
consumers were permitted to purchase a part of their requJrements from ration shops 
at heavily subsidized prices and at the same time a pe-t~alle'l' private market was 
allowed to operalefor those whoserequirement was mo~e than the ration shop. quota~13 
There are sufficient grounds to assume that the agricultural poli~tffi of the 
r:egime had an Urban bias, but the govt. simultaneouniously was selling agricultural 
t:i-.puts at subsidized rates to the farmers. The domestic price of fertilizer was 
increased, without doubt, about 270 per-cent in 1973 and 1974 in order to reduce the 
fertilizer subsidy, but the cost of this subsidy still continuedl;J rise because of the 
international ferti 1 izer price increases and increased consumption. It was because of 
the rise in fertilizer prices that the govt. fixed the procurement price of wheat for the 
1975 crop nearly 50';/c higher than that of 1974 and about 120'7{- higher than that of 1971. 
Simultaneously, the govt. raised the prices cf wheat flour (atta) correspondingly by the 
summer of 1975 in order to prevent the subsidy to consumers increasing. This in 
,!;ur0,' was .a~compan ted by increase in wages of both public and private sector emf~0vees 
to offset the higher cost of wheat in low income Family budgets. Thus what Erruk{..s:_aJl.s.--, 
" Urban bais " in adoption of polices may partly be interpretted as subsidy-price-wage-
adjustment package. This type of adjustment package ltrad taken place in july-Aggust 
1973 also . 
But the argument of Burki that the public policies of the govt. in the 
first phase had an urban IPi.as cannot be dismissed because t:h e ur_ban consumer seems 
i ; 
to be consumingr$\uch of the food items like suga~~ atta, rice, p~'l·~ce-i:tcat highly 
subsidized rates whereas the rural producer:-· was· only being partly comper_isated 
through '; inp1,-1tJ subsidies for the low prices which he was receivinq for his fairm 
- _,,,-- I 
produce.'- 1 - t;- - -·'·:'""·"11~ 
The2hastilyintroduced reforms in other sectors like health, education, labour, 
administration etc. had far-read!iing impacts on the farm sector. Here the impact of the 
administrative reform on agricultural sector would be relevant and would illustrate the 
point. As stated above, there were unprecedented floods in Pakistan in 1973. 200 
human ,lives~)were lost, 4 millior.«acres of -Gropland was inundated, some 885000 homes 
were se~iously damaged, 54000 he-ads of li\/estock were lost and$ 38 million of damage 
was done to roads and other, co~munications infrastructure. The govt. estimated the ID< 
total loss at $ 800 mill ion. 14 
ThJ:S damage could have been less extensive' had the various Qt"Slnche'S of the 
bureaucracy moved in time to help the affected areas. But the bureacuracy ·was 
being re-organised that very summer; those who could have acted, had either been 
retired or removed from office or demoralished. The Chief Secretaries and the flood 
relief commissioners of the provinces of Punjab and Sind had lost their jobs under 
the reforms . Thus without guidance from the above, the bureaucrali,c response was 
slow. One manifestation of this was the inability to organise the delivery of basic 
items of consumption to the af$cted are as. During this crrrses, ~e;:,ple :1ad to gQ f'0r 
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'In 
days without petrol and cooking oil./Northern areas, the price of cooking oil trebled • 
athe situation worried the Govt. The remedy to this problem was sought in the 
nationalisation of the v~getable oi.l(ghee) industry. This nationalisation hurt the middle 
class as a good propor..;tion of the cooking oil industry was owned by small and middle-
sized entrepreneurs. Some of these were active PPP supporters and many other were 
favourably disposed to the party. The decision was, therefore, resented by the Govt. 's 
own constituency which generated pressure on Bhutto to reduce the influence of the left 
in the economic decision-making. Thegovt. was also brought into closer contact with the 
cotton producers as a result of this nationalisation(because a blll.lrk of the cotton seed is utili-
zed for making cooking oi.l). These farmers did not like the bureaucrats who took over the 
control of the 5q nationalized firms in this industry. They did not possess 
the expertise 01r. the capital of the owners they had displaced. The cotton farmers needed 
both. More9ver, it soon became clear that most of the new managers were COtli'rrpt and 
sought brit;res 11 for lifting the farmer's produce 11 • 15 
Bhutto therefore pecame disenchanted with the ultra-leftist elements. He 
accordingly decided to replace them by relatively moderate people in October, 1974 • 
Mubashir Hasan, J.A. Rahim, Khurshid Hasan Meer, Ministers of Finance, Production, 
Establishment respectively and representatives of the PPP left were replaced by mild 
mannered Rana Hanif and Rafi Raza (both lawyers by profession) and General(Retd) • 
Jamaldar. Yousaf Khatta)>,an old Muslim Leaguer and a prominent businessman 
took over as Minister for Fuel, Power and Natural Resources. Agriculture was the only 
ministry that went to the left. Sheikh Rashid the new Agriculture Minister remained in the 
Cabinet probably to placate the le~ and to balance the landed arist~eracy from Punjab and)CXln 
Sind who were now brought into the PPP in large numbers • 
With the established groups now back in important cabinet positions, it was 
intended that much of the decision making would elevolve on the bureaucracy. New appoint-
ments were made to the more important economic ministries; the dEivisi.ons of Finance, 
' Planning and Development were put under the charge of A.G.N. Kazi, a senior Civil 
Servant with a long record of service. The stage was thus set for the bureaucratisation 
of decision making .. Bureacuracy however was unable to perform that dominant role 
which it had played during the latter part of the Ayub era mainly due to (i) Bhutto's 
dominance in decision-making (ii) the drastic change that had been incorporated earlier 
in the structure of bureaucracy • 
In substitution, the Prime Minister and his secretariat played the dominant 
de~ision-making role. A part of the bureaucracy was re-organized along project rather 
than functional lines; where such re-organisation p ould not be undertaken, new 
organisations were set up. Population Planning Division was set up to pursue an 
ambitious family planning programme, Manpower Division was organised to facilitate 
the export of manpower to the Middle East, Agrarian Management division was set up 
to administer and control the agro-based industries, firms and corporations which were 
under or were recently brought under public control. Similarly, the procurement and 
distribution of food was separated from Agriculture division, and Rural development was 
also separated from Agriculture. Each of these new dvisi.ons was to lookrfter one or two 
important projects • 
With the Planning Commission weakened ans with the establishment of a number 
of single purpose di.visions, it became increasingly difficult to define a set of objectives 
central to all economic decisions. What ensued was a 3 years period of decision making 
without constraints. The regime embarked upon a number of long-gestation sbhemes with 
emphasis on grand solutions to Pakistan's economic problems which claimed a large 
proportion of development resources. These schemes generated a political momentum of 
their own wh_ich the ruccessor Govt. found very difficult to halt and which made it impossible 
to adopt more innovative solutions to the nations economic ]!Jroblens .• -Son:e .. of·~tb.ese.1oiig;:;:g_-e:::;tati=on 
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projects were (i) Karachi ~teel {f"ills(ii) 800 miles long Indus Highway, (iii) 
Installation of a dozen number/r?eactors to meet the country's energy gap( iv) 
construction of a Lowari Tunnel in order to connect the northern areas with the 
rest of Pakistan and (v) construction of a sports-complex at Islamabad . 
16 The eecisions to construct these projects were examples of economic decision~ 
'Eaken for essentially non-economic reasons" Agriculture which could have helped the 
country out of a number of its economic difficulties did not receive the attention it 
dese1n..v,ed. In the 1974-77 phase, the regime did attend to agriculture, but the 
measures adopted yielded little because they were not aimed at the mes t dynamic 
sectors of the rural community, the middle class wheat growers, who had brought 
the green revolution, and the small farmers. The big_; landlords, who had joined the 
PPP ranks now, wanted to be suitably rewarded for erXternding $.qzport to the Prime 
Minister. The suitable rewards demanded by the landed ~stocracy were adoption of 
agricultural polices which specifically suited the large farmers. Ayub Khan's 
_ green revolution created divisions of farming communities into roughly 3 categories. 
The large landitbrds, while growing foodgrains on a limited scale, came to 
specialize in the production of such cash crops as cotton, sugarcane, and oil seeds • 
The middle-sized farmers, while growing these cask'! crops on a limited scale, 
specialized in the production of hyvs of wheat and rice. The small farmers, however, 
continued to produce foodgrains for On-farm consumption. According to the fird ings 
of Burki, Bhutto in the second phase adopted an incentive structure that favoured 
only one category of farmers, that is the bigl,-.landlords growing cotton. Consequently, 
" the fPr,EUIJ\3§ of the large-scale cotton growers in the Srutbe,r.rn districts of the 
Punjab and Northern districts of Sind" flourished in this period because for them 
the real cost declineq by 46% between 1970/71 ••..••.• and 1975/76"~7According 
to Brown and Gotsch~8a sharp deterioration in the agriculture's terms of trade 
occured after 1974 when the landed:interest::(representing a very small minibrity) 
were installed once again in important decision making roles. Brown and Gotsch have 
also revealed that the years 1974-76 marked consecutiN!e years of decline that 
resulted in one of the most iLiRifavourable .ratios to be found in the entire 20 years 
for which they have calculated the price rJnde& .. 19 
The government's approach to mechanisation reflected the desire to favour 
large farmers. In 1974-75, the purchase prices of tractors as well as the costs of 
maintaining them were reduced. Measures were adopted to expand the role of the 
Govt. controlled Agricultural Development Bank,(which, as we have seen in Chapter-I; 
advances medium term and long-term and supervised credit for major capital 
investments oriented towards the large farmers) in making credit available for the 
purchase of tractoes. This promotion of farm mechanisation "helped the landlords 
to displace tenants and sharecroppers with hired workers even th.,...·ough the tenants had 
legal rights on the land they cultivated."20 
Trade in foodgrains, after the creation of Pakistan, had been largely with 
petty merchants and small rural inudstrialists. In July, 1976, the regime decided to ilU!• 
assume the management~, of some gj.000 agro-industries like flour-milling rice-milling 
and cotton-gthning pactciries. This decision according to Burki was entirely 
political and not :reEiological and was arrived at to benefit the big landlords. "The 
real political and economic significance of this measure was that it result?d in the 
vertical integration of the agricultural sector in the sease that the landeda:tGistocracy 
now had a share not only in producing a sizeable part of the output traded in the rra rket 
but also in the marketing, processing and ii:fistribution of this output 11~1By directly 
intervening in these industries, the regime disloged the middle class merchants 
and brought in tin:e large landlords and their representatives. to manage the 4000 
nationalized enterprises. ,An, _V:r.:_d_u .. ~.9-~t.ly, Nawa-·i-Waqt, found 
_) ' ' '--" 't - l ,/ W :: I/' -
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evidengit that of the 4000 new managers, nearly 2/3rd had close links with the 
large landlords who had now become prominent in the PPP. Thus the agricultural 
policies adopted by the Bhutto regime in the second phase benefited the large 
farmers. The petty grain traders, small agro-industrilists, small and 
subsistence level farmers were the worst-ltiit by these piblicies. As these 
groups were, initially, sbcong PPP supporters, Bhutto antagonized them, by ,., 
adopting such m,easures. He tried to win back their sympathies, by announcing anoth<! 
land reform on 5 January, 1 977, about 2 months before general elections. Th is 
land reform reduced private holdings to 100 acres of irrigated and 200 acres of 
unirrigated Land. Again the motive behind this reform was political rather taan 
ideological pr economic. The announcement of this land reform surprised 
everyone, especially his land lord supporters. This sudden .sbi~ in policy 
· · . h . po11c1es . . 11 enabled htm to remind the pubhc ~ow fully the nat10n'sJurned on hts will and 
whim". 23 
Conclusion 
The economic rreJ'.Q:".A?introduced by the Bhutto regime in the first phase 
(1972-1974) added a major elerre nt of uncertainty in economic relations, which 
could not be removed by subsequent assurances. Nationalization of significant part 
of inudstry and almost the entire financial system without adequate::; foreth...:.,ought 
raised serious problems of efficient public sector management. While problems of 
management were affecting performance of the large scale industrial sector, 
the nationalization of agracrian industries extended the effect of SLC h policies 
\:.:@.c1smaller industries dealing directly with the agricultural sector whose 
performance was also affected by the indifferent implementation of the land 
reforms • 
During the later years of the first phase and in the second phase, the 
impact of a severe international economic crises was felt in Pakistan. Wortd 
tnf.lation, tre rise in energy prices brought down terms of trade of Pakistan 
by 28% between 1973 and 1975141-he response of the Bhutto govt. to meet the 
severity of this international crises was inadequate. In'Si!estment commitments w.ere r 
made for major non-economic projects. Agriculture which could ahve helped the 
country.out of its economic difficulties did not receive much funds. By, 1977, 
the cum& lative impact of the persistent agricultural stagnation combined with 
enlarged commitments for large developrrent projects and non-development 
expenditure on subsidies had created an economic impasse • 
Income distrlibution among the farrrtWg communities worsened during this 
period. This appears to have happened a.Dlef-:;everal national and international 
ca1;1sal factors, but most of which can be attributed to the agricultural 
policies pursued by the regime. In the first phase the agricultural policies had a 
strorig~r.bar.n tias and in tee second t:hro policies favoured the cultivators of cash 
crops like cotton which only the big land-lords specialized. The middle class 
farmers specialized in foodgrain_s~ and cultivated cotton on a very limited scale • 
The small farmers only cultivated foodgrains for on the farm consumption. The 
cultivators of food grains sustained deterioration in terms of trade as the major 
benefit of the public policies went to the cotton.-growers. The wheat growers 
sustained a loss of income because they sold their supplus produce to the Govt • 
at low prices for the urban consumers. Thus the most important reason for the 
agricultural stagnation was the decline in the share in total c':\Mealth of the 
middle and small farmers. These groups sustained a loss in income because 
they were, especially in the second phase, excluded from the ruling party's 
decision making positions • 
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Bureaucracy during the first phase was demoralized and disturbed owing 
to the administrative reforms and in the second phase, it had neither the power 
to discipline such a dominee:i;.ing figure like Z. A. Bhutto nor the ability 
to contain the ad-hoe and grand decisions being taken in the Prime Minister's 
secretariat • 
The first phase of Bhutto regime was a phase of either abolition of 
institutions (like Basic democracies) or of restructuring institutions(like 
replacement of the Agricultural development corporation by Agricultural 
supplies corporation referred to in Chapt;er~~) which created a lot of uncertainty 
and upheaval in the rural sector. The role of the public sector in the management 
of the agricultural sector expanded at a time when the administrati:v:e structure 
was also being re-fashioned. It was at that crucial time in a transitional stage 
and had no longer the strength to shoulder this additional burden. Thli!s does not 
mean that the administrative reforms wiere un-necessary, but their timing 
was unfortunate • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
-5.5-
CHAPTER 5 
HOW GREEN IS THE "GRE~N REVOLUTION" NOW (1977 ONWARDS) 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's fall from power came swiftly. On 5 
January, 1977 he surprised his landlord supporters with his second land 
reform. On 7 January, 1977, he announced the dates for the national and 
provincial elections. The national elections were to be held on March 
7, 1977 and the provincial elections on March 10, 1977. In both the elec-
tions, Bhutto's Pakistan Peoples Party(PPP) won in 3 of the four pro-
vinces of the country. The opposition,Pakistan National Alliance(PNA), 
which was expecting to win the elections or at least many more seats 
than it had done in the 1970 elections, found it difficult to accept thE 
results and charged that Bhutto and his associates had massively rigged 
the elections. They opened a campaign against the government that quick-
ly gained momentum. Only a month later, that is on 9th April,1977, the 
army was battling with protesting .. mobs in all the major cities. Unable 
to control the mounting violence, Bhutto was forced to impose military 
rule in the principal urban.areas but the violence did not subside. On 
5 July, 1977, Bhutto was forced out of office of the Prime Minister by 
the Pakistan Army. Thus ended Pakistan's second experiment with civiliar 
rule.1 
With the advent of the present regime in July,1977,measures 
have been taken to.restore private sector's confidence and to revive 
output and exports. Agro-based industries like cotton ginni-ng, rice-
milling and flour-milling units have been denationalized, export rebate 
procedures simplified and special incentives for the ailing textile in-
dustry have been granted. Present government's five pronged strategy · 
seeks an agricultural revolution,the re-vitalization of the industrial 
sector, re-suscitation of the textile-industry and re-invXigoration of 
the small industries sector. Agriculture, Rural development and meeting 
every one's basic needs are now the main focus of the government. The 
success of this approach, as viewed by the regime, is a determination 
to delay costly new projects until some of the long-gestation projects, 
started by the Bhutto regime are completed.2 
An impartial study evaluating the performance of the agricul-
tural sector in this period,. that is in the Annual Development Plan 
1977-78 and the Fifth Five Year Plan (1978-1983), has yet to come, yet 
according to the figures released by the government, the sector is 
developing now. Comparing with the 2 periods of agricultural stagn~.tion 
when the average rate of growth in agriculture was 1.6% (in the 50s) andl 
l.7% during 1970-77(se Table 3(2), the average growth rate of agricul-
ture in the period under consideration ha~ been encouraging. Its average 
growth rate was 4.2% per annum in 1977-80. According to Far Eastern 
Economic Review, the Fifth 5 year, Plan of which, more than 4 years has, . 
elapsed has not been an outstandi'ng success because of a "lack of 
private sector's enthusiasm and the government's insistence on continuing 
major industrial projects such as the Steel Mill at Karachi and long-
gestation water and power projects, including the giant Tarbela Dam" 4 
(These long-gestation projects were initiated by the Bhutto regime) . 
The annual growth rate in the farm sector, for the first four years of 
the Fifth Plan (1978-83), according to Review, has been 4.5% down from 
the, 6% annual target.because the fertilizer off-~ake has gone down and~ 
,the growth rate is peaking . 
Nevertheless, the most outstanding achievement of the present 
regime is that the agricultural sector is no longer stagnating and is, 
in fact, again ready to gain momentum towards more rapid growth. The 
country has now achieved self-sufficiency in wheat and rice. Import of 
wheat was discontinued in J.981. The country has been exporting rice and 
has now begun importing wheat. In 1981, Pakistan had 600 million dollars 
worth of food to export and during 1982,the country sold 700 to 800 5 
million dollars worth of food i terns, including poultry, fruit, and.Vegetable;:>. 
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However, the country is still not producing enough to meet the basic food 
needs of the population in some commodities. The per capita availability of animal 
proteil') in Pakistan is one of the lowest in the World. There has been chronic sbortage 
of essential agricultural commodies in theq5:::tst four years like edible oil, pulses, dair) . 
products and timber which had to be imported at the huge cost of foreign exchange and 
overall economic development. There are various factors which limit agricultural 
pro::.duction in Pakistan like (i) high population growth rate which is about 3% per 
annum and which correspondingly reduces annual average growth rates in agriculture(i1 
the low man-land ratio which is about O. 59 acres per capita (iii) loss of a good 
proporation of cultivated land every year due to water-logging, salinity and soil 
erosion(iv) periodic occurence of floods and ''qroughts and wide-spread prevalence of 
insect ~ests and diseases of plants (v) ,irnabil ity of the common-man to pay prices of 
milk and meat commensurate with the cost of production on commercial scalEl, 
resulting in economically non-viable dairy and meat industries and (vi) the non-availa~ 
bility of the site-specific package of technology for the important agricultural commo-
dities in various agro-ecological zones. 6 
These are important development constraints which the present regime has 
in~e/ited fron:i.,the previous governments.o.f Pakistan, but the major development 
constraint which the present govt. has irJhe~itedand which it shall have to remove 
ei><ists in the socio-economic envirorime~g of tit?, prevalent production system and whicr 
is the main theme of the present study. The_fle1dstud,ies done by some writers 
have brought to light the major social and economic consequences of the new l:Di:ological 
cum-agricultural technology introduced by Ayub regime and pursued by the 
successive governre nts of Pakistan and which is popularity called the "green 
revolution". Its socio-economic impact has been briefly highlighted in chapters 3 and 
4; that impact is further discussed here . 
The introduction of modernised agricultural technology has covered 
substantial a<!reage in Pakistan f);IJ§ has brought about a significant increase in the 
I' 
output of foodgr-ain. The country is self-sufficient now if"l at least rice and wheat and : -
has become a big:--.exporter of these commodities. But thepountry is not self-
sufficient in other cereals and proteins even on the basis of current and admittedly 
inael?qqate levels of consupiption. Nor has it freed agricultural production from· the 
- 7'-- ~ -
fluctua~iumrs that climatic and environmental variations have exposed it to in the 
' I 
p~t, like the prolonged drought of 1971-72, 1973 floods, although with the compleUom-
ofTarbela, Mangla and other small dams, the possibilities of drought have been 
reduced. The increase that has taken place in production has not been eve'nly spaced 
between different social groups or regions or cereals. The new technology, therefore, 
has still to be nurtured and developed if it is to achieve the objectives of food self-
sufficiency, nutritional ba.tterment and social justice • 
Where the technology has been applied in substantial measure, as in Punjab 
or in some pants of Sind, the resulting benefits by way of increased returns have not 
been equally st;i'ared by the different size groups farms with the result that the rich 
have grown richer and the ~oor comparatively poorer with understargabte consequences 
on social and political harmony in the. country-:-s ide. This aspect of the green _ 
revolution has been examined byGotsch _ed;q.l_'. bsing a linear programming model, 17 
Got:sch has examined the relationship between techno-logy, prices and income 
distribution in Pakistan after the green revolution, and has demonstrated that on a~ 
typical 12.6 acre farm in the Punjab_,using tube-well water and advanced rice, 
··maize and wheat technology, the ,index of c~opping intensity could profitably 
increase from 110 to 1 52 with an associated 85% inceease in net revenue • 
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This study related to an area intensively irrigated by canal and supplemented by tube-
we ll water, but in another study conducted by Rochin sho'2s the impact of the new ll'.lPt,.I.t~ __, 
on production in the rain-fed district of Hazara (now a dlivision and subdivided into 
3 districts), where the dwarf vari' eties of whea~,. have doubled yields per acre. These twc 
studies show the element of profiltability involved in the adoption cf the modernised agri-
cultural technology. These two writers and Shahid9uaved Burki are in substantial 
agreement that the major beneficiaries oft he productivity juW1ps in Pakistan have been 
the medium (50 to 100 acres) and large farmers. The authors agree that a large 
proporation of farmers in all size categories appear to have obtained some absolute 
increase in prodcution through the widespread adoption of the Hyvs of rice a.nd .wheat but 
. rural income disparities, they say, have increased considerably. Thus the IJ)ues:tranrEtli"ig 
achievement of rapid growth in agricultural production, they cone lude, has kn"o.ught with it 
unanticipated consequesoes for social and political structures in rural areas • 
Given the profitalbility of Hyvs_, One can expect an increase in capitalistic 
farming, the attempted eviction by landlords of their tenants followed by increased 
cultivation with hired labour, and the byying out of small farmers by .rarge farmers • 
And with the substitution of capital for labour, the demand for labour would fall unless 
the expansion in output is sufficient to overcome the substitution effect. Findings of 
various writers differ on Pakistan in so far as this hypothesis is concerned. There is 
a conseosus on the point that land ownership patterns influence the response of 
cultivato.ns_- to the nrw agricultural technology, but they interpret it in different ways • 
Burki finds evidence qhat the quick response of the 7 best districts to the opportunities 
of the green revolution was related to the predominence of middle-sized holdings. It 
sounds reasonable as the size of holding may generally be taken as an index of the total 
resources available to a farmer and is important in determining the surplus available 
for investment and ease of his access to credit. Ma~'"' Lowder---milk' ~eports that the small 
farmers have not been sil.ow in adopting the new dwarf wheat ya_ri~~iE?;~·However, only the 
larger farmers have access to reliable sources of water (i.e. tube wells), farm power 
(i.e. tractors), information and/or cash to use the proper ". ~'2ckage" of inputs and 
practices required by the new varieties of crops. Hamza Alvi explains that in some cases, 
the size distrLb:ution of tenant farms is similar to that of owner farms, for not all tenant 
farms are small. .This being the case, it is possible that some tenant farms can over--come 
the investment ?are:-le~ _ to adoption of the modernised agricultural technology. In some 
selected cases, Hamza Alvi must be right because the irrigated Pun Jab has been characte ri 
-zed by a relatively commercialized agriculture specializing in cash crops for several 
gen'erations, but these cash crops are largely th®agg'notexclusively, the monopoly of the 
larger farmers or large farms either operated by the owners or by tenants. It is 
therefore not uncommon (in such selected cases) for landlords to assist their tenants • 
But there are still major questions of equity involved in the distribution of income between 
large and small farmers in Punjab as well as other areas of Pakistan . 
13 
A much more comprehensive study has been done by Mahmood Hasan Khan which 
covers major aspects of the socio-economic impact of the prevalent production system 
in agriculture. He says that the Hvvs of wheat and rice are more efficient than the old 
varieties which reflects their genehic strength and responsiveness to water and 
fertilizer. He also finds evidence that large and small farms are equally efficient in 
producing the new seeds of wheat and rice. But the large farms in Pakistan, he says, 
enjoy preferential access to physical inputs, credit and markets because there e<ists 
a high degree of concenwation of land ownership and use, which enables the owners/ 
operators of large farms a' disproR-Q_rtionate use of market. power (ii) the strategy for 
agricultural development pursued by the SL:l~'?essive governrre nts of Pakistan has 
increased this power through subsidies on. inputs and outputs. The subsidization of inputs 
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to encourage their use, Mr. Khan adds, almost always introduces imperfections 
in factor markets. Further a subsidy, he says, can be an ;tnstrument of encouraging 
socially desirable transfers of income. Pakistan's experience shows that this is not 
the best way to achieve the intended goal of parity among sectors or income groups . 
In view of the heavy reliance oh subsidy on agricultural inputs in Pakistan and the fact 
that the access to these inputs has been unequal between large and small farmers, 
Mr. Khan concludes, that the income transfers have taken place from the weak to the 
strong • 
The green revolution has had somewhat .~ia1ilar socio-economic impacts in other 
parts. of the developing world. P. N. Junankar, 'in his study of Ferozepur district of PUijsE; 
(Indicl!Punjab) finds evidence that through application of modern agricultural technology, 
"the larger farmer receives a dispt'.'oportionately large increase in income". This result 
also supports Bardhan's findings in his comparative study of Indian provinces ofU.P • 
P-unjab, West Bengal and Maharashtra.1.5 
Here it neeels to be d-a.rified that, with the introduction of the high yielding varieties ~ 
of crops, the traditional negative relationship between farm size, on the one hand, and 
cost and yield, on the other, no longer holds. Larger farms in Pakistan, as 
i llti.lstrated in the cb ove noted studies, have increased intensity of cultivation, 
particularly in applying the new technology inputs, neutralising the previous advantage 
of smaller farms. In terms of surplus generation, large farms;·_ perform best. 
According to the findings of DasguptJ~ the larger farmers (in the case of India where 
the conditions are not dissimilar to those of Pakistan) have to incur the higher per-
centage of cost on hired Labour, but this disadvantage, he says, has been upset in 3 
ways:-
i) 
i i) 
i ii) 
' 
the rental 
Even a. 1small.farm.1-11DUSt now hire.L.labour, for transplanting, haresting and general y coping Wl1.r 1 c1me conscrants; 
1...arge farmers are using more machinery, expensive to buy but cost-saving; 
Smaller farmers are dependent on larger farmers for use of machiner~ 
they pay is higher than the maintenance and depreciation cost of the owners • 
All this influences the cost of production per ~ilogram in favour of the large farmers • 
It is, the re fore, generally the case that the larger the farm, thtl lower the cost of 
production for beyond a certain size, mechanisation becomes essential for keeping 
cost:7down • 
Another impact of tl<r8 green revolution in Pakistan has been that it has created 
regional tension and di~rmon ies between the irrigated and non-irrigated areas of 
Pakistan because of the' integral connection between an ass"u:r<.ed water supply and the 
new techno~'eQY. The extent of increased regional disparities has been documented by 
Alail, Gotsch and Hasan 1•9 The data and evidence collected by the 3 writers show strong 
relative gains by the Punjab province generally and by particular districts in the Punjab . 
Amot-h~r.' n:laojd.c3fmlpac teo·f~ll'e -~~{r:~err rev-df ul:ion Fi ass beM°n.Jl!hM1 i t:tnas1 'cr:el3:tea' cnah§es in 
ffi~iagrarian structure as a result of which rural Pakistan's political and sociako 
structures and economtc and technological behaviours are changing. To Raulet, the, 
s i:f'n ificant changes include much improved rural security, greatly increased 
transportation and i.~me_nse expanst ion of irrigated areas. To Burkf ,1 as illustrated in 
Chapter 3, Green Revolution has given'ris~-to an enterprising middle-class farmer 
specialising in production of wheat and rice and with his ::-~.se· the process of an 1Lll!1ending 
conflict between him and the big:1 landlord or between him, and the small farmer and 
tenant farmer has ~~aJ:-ced "What will this conflict do to ~he political and economic system"' 
II 
Burki asks and with a guarded opttmism, he replies that'there is a good po_ssibility that 
the stram caused by tne major change in the agricultural sector will not~..ear apart 
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the political, social an8 ~_conomic fabric". To him, therefore, the rural: social· system 
of Pakistan is sufficient?",,e Lastic to accommodate to changing conditions. Gotsch, howe-
ver, is fi)assimistic about it. He f:G>re-sees that the new emerging class of progressive 
middle· and larger farmers will have increasing prolitical influence to pressu;fse ·for 
continued high agricultural price supports and low taxescand would oppose increased 
public control over water resources and mechanisation. (That is what the larger 
farmers dicfdur.ing the social coq.\iltien grqup rule- in the period from 1952-1958, 
and during latter years of Ayub 1and Bhutto regin'1es as explained in Chapters 2-4) • 
Th~ result of this package of policies will be to increase income disparities an_d fu~ther 
ex'a.C:~rbate rising rural unemployment. He therefore does not believe that in the 
near future Pakistani rural society will easily develop the reformist instruments 
necessary to cope with these contradictions.2 2 
. 23 
Moreover, it has been strewi.g ly arg:::.ie(J by Michael Lipt~:>rn, in the case of 
developing countries and by Bl:trki in the case of Pakistan that agricultural policies are 
generally urban inb.ta:sand tha~.;.Wechanisation policies:; IJA-e-:.inte~rests of the . - ··' 
urban elite, urban consumers of agricultural produce as a whole and those in 
the country-side who control a high proportion of natural and capital resources are 
identical\eertainly, evidence of the advantages of large farmers, as foreseen by Gotscf: 
I • 
and others, is plentiful in the case of Pakistan, including influence on the tmport 
commercial environment through political means, which may include the shaping of /f'-1.,~ 
f?,}plicies designed to keep low the farmer's purchasing price for imported machinery an< 
delaying tactics over implementation of various provis.ions of land reforms.~-~ . 
Conclusion 
The agricultural growth in Pakistan which gained its momentum in early 
1960's with the onset of the green revolution, experienced slow-down in the late 
sixties and stagnation in the 71-77 period, is again gaining momentum. Agriculturel 
has completely recovered from its a- utumnal stage and is fairly green now. The 
4. 5% annual growth rate of the farm sector for the first 4 years of the Fifth 5 years 
plan, as compared to the 3% .annual growth rate in pop-ulation is fairly satisfa<Z:tt_0ry 
The most outstanding achievement in this period has been that the country is - not 
only self-sufficient in wheat, but is able to export. The critical problems which have 
been limiting agricultural development, like salinity, water-logging, over crowding 
erosion and drought hazards still e~ist however and need to be removed by the 
present regime • 
But -the most important problem which the present regime has to deal with 
relates to the socio-economic aspect of the prevalent production system. The 
modern agricultural technology introduced by the Ayub Regin-eand tmrswed by the 
successive governments has brought about a change in the agrarian structure in 
favour of larger holdings, capitalistic farming and the reduction in tenancies. 
The case studies conducted on the socio-economic impacts of the green revolution 
revieal!that-~gricultural modernisation, if left to the continuing sway of its - - : · 
·· current style of progress, is bound to lead to social injustice, widening inequalities 
and inalbility to find employment for the existing labour-force in agriculture • 
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This dees not mean that the prevail tng style of the production 
system in agriculture cannot be improved; it can be but for this purpose 
proper techniques need to be discovered and applied immediately. What these 
techniques are and to what extent these are being applied by the present 
regime are the theme of the subsequent Chapters . 
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CHAPTER 6 
Alternative Policy Approaches: - Strategy and Reform 
Agrarian reform is necessary for the social advancement of the rural, poor 
and the landless peasants. According to .a data presented in a paper in a seriDJIJar~oo 
Rural Development Programme in November, 19?1.'.4, 11 there were the following 
7 land tenure categories in Pakistan . 
1 • 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6 . 
7 . 
Category Cha racte r.:i ist tc-s Percentage of 
Agricultural 
house holds . 
Landlord 
' L I I • ~ ~ 
Small landlord 
Family-owned 
cultivator, 
'Irr:igatea-· land above 150 
acres - Owned 
(or corresponding acreage 
non-irrigated land i.e. daub le) 
Irrigated land above 25 acres to 
1 50 acres -owned 
II II 7. 5 acrea to 
25- acres 
Marginal owners I Irrigated land upto 7. 5 acres 
cultivators-
Tenant of better standing- 11111111 " 11 upto 12. 5 acres 
Rented or partly owned 
Tenant at will - Under 1 2. 5 acres Rented ·~ 
Landless Labourer· - No land owned or rented -
1 
4 
8 
30 
14 
33 
10 
According to this data, there were 43% landless houselho lds in Pakistan 
out of which 33% were earning their livelihood as tenp.n~~gpd the remaining as 
agricultural labourers. According to the above noted/~he to'tal estimated number 
of agricultural households in 1962 in Pakistan was 5. 2 million,43% of -which comes 
to 120930 households. t.-1171 is means that in 1973, the re we re at least 120930 Families 
which were earning their livelihood as tenants or labourers. According to another 
study conducted by the world 18.ank~f . :, there were 7 million people in Pakistan 
comprising of one million households who were cultivatirig less tha171 5 acres of (non 
viable) land-holding and another 6 million people compr.Lsing of another one million 
rural house-holds which were landless. This figure of (6-F7) 13 million rural poor 
in Pakistan is not very much as compared with the corresponding figure of 70 million 
in Bangladesh and 327 million in India shown in the same study, yet it is a sizeable 
segment of the rural population. Obviously this category cf small farmers with a 
non-viable farming profession and the agricultural labourers would earn th§.ir 
livelihood as labourers or by engaging in non-agricultural employment. It needs 
to be further clarified as to who can be a small farmer with a viable holding. A small 
farmer, if he is to be viable in his farming activity, should have a real income which 
is comparable to that obtained by those ~i.thcorresponding skills in industry, this is 
the criter. ion applied in J~l'."lP-n. On the bas1s of the world Ba:tnk study quoted above, 
• 
• 
• 
• 
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• 
• 
it shoulp- be possible to obtain such an income with a minimum holding of 5 drr.igated 
act'es3-: and operated on modern lil'V'es for a houselhold comprising of 5 or so 
dependents; its equivalent for rain -fed areas would be 1 O acres and for a·r.ia anti 
semi-arid areas almost 15 acres. The agri£§-lltural holdings in Pakistan,' if this 
critE2.cion .• : was applied would not be regarded;Viable or even as small holdings. The 
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,. -man-land rati1D of cultivated land, as indicated in Chapter 5, is about~- 59 acres 
per capita, and as such, a non-viable ratio according to our definition. At the same 
time, the 47% of the agricultural ~louse-holds working as tenants and another 10% 
house-holds working as landless labourers or the 13 mill ion people categorized by the 
world Bank study as the "rural poor" need to be so rewarded by the public policies 
that they can adequately put their resources and energy in their occupation . 
One way to reward these famblies is to redistribute land and assets away from 
the ~lands of a few, but-this 17ril"iRY or may not be possible without violence. Big 
landlords and the dominence of theuroban interests over rural interests in Pakistan 
are some of the constraints which may not allow land reform startegy to suceed and 
may call for, theoretically speaking, revolutionary transf:ormation of the rural 
set-up. These are powerful constraints which limit the results that can reasonably 
be axpected from the policy making system of Pakistan. But this is not the position 
taken here. The position taken in this study is that the problems facing rural :Pak. are* 
more moderate means than revolutionary solutions. Revolutionary solutions cause 
considerable upheaval, loss of production, new conditions and new problems. That is 
what happened during Bhutto period (as we have seen in Chapter 4). What is needed 
in the case of Pakistan is a kind of policy-making system that does not seem too 
radical, that does not promise to transform society massively and rapidly and that 
which seeks steady and persistent change to give all the popt::ilation an equitable share m· 
the resources of tre country. No doubt this seems unexciting, but it has the 'Wit.:'tue 
of realism not only in reflecting existing conditions, bu't also in suggesting ho~ far 
and how quickly they can be changed. This kind of reform strategy is· suitable for 
Pakistan because the land available per capita is very low and a radical land reform 
aimed at redistribution for the purpose of giving every cultivator an economic, 
viable holding alongwith what would be politically implementable as a resonable 
ceiling on the larger holdings, does not appear to be a practicable proposition 
without lb:loodshed and f7e.ud ir:ig . 
It is toue that Japan was able to effect an effective land reform but that was 
under military occupation. China was able to effect an equally drastic re-distributionnt 
of land but after a people's revolution. Even in Japan the move now is for an enlargemE 
of the size of the holdings, while in China, the !:?mall holdings, have been enlarged in 
operational size through setting up of comm~ne.s, production b.r4!gades and production 
teams:4•. _. Some other successful examples of land reform in the developing world arE 
those of Taiwan and Korea. As regards other countries including Pakistan, the reform~ 
have not been very successful . 
Agricultural policy, 1980 of Pakistan recognises the importance of 
equitable distribution of land but for the time-being lays emphasis on the enforcement 
of tenancy law. Security of tenure and other facilities for the tenants have been 
assured under the three successive land reforms since 1958, the policy document says 
and recommends that the necessary measures are required to be taken to achieve the 
pEirtpnse'XD'f these land reforms? The three land reforms, as we have already seen 
in Chapters 3-4, had only marginal impact on the pattern of landholding an.d little 
short-Fun effect on development because most of their provisions were indeHferently 
implemented and the fate of another reform, if not vigorously implemented, may be 
the same. What is considered to be more practicable by the policy document now -
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is l:he agrarian reform. 61·~~. Agrarian reform is a much more comprehensive 
concept than land reform since i.t ifil.\'.'.iQ,l~~o:-, cha~ges in price policies so as to turn 
the terms of trade in favour of the agricultural sector, increasing allocations 
to the sector in order to expand research, extension, training and storage facilities; 
making physical facilities, like fertilizers available and increasing credit for their -· 
purchase or providing infra-scructure to facilitate production. Agrarian reform trr.layGH' 
may not include land reform; in some instances there may be no need for land reform 
since land is already eveoly~,- distributed. In other cases, it may not be politically 
feasible to have land reform. Experience with land reform in Pakistan in the past 
points to the overriding importance of the political factor.in securing meaningful change, 
The coni.; .. centration of control over land protiides-a power lbiase for many social groups. 
Land is a symbol of authority and a source of political power; the landowner -in 
Pakistan controls the access of peasants to their only source of security-land. A 
meaningful land reform programme will inevitally destroy or limit the power l::lase of 
many persons. It is not supris ing, therefore, that land reform in Pakistan has often 
been a central issue in political delbates, which were o~en couched in terms of 
redistributing political power as well as wealth .. Aml)itious programmes of land 
*• reform will never be implemented in Pakistan unless there are revolutionary shifts 
~enya and in political sentimen~and power. The effective land reforms in other developing 
7 
"'l'exitco was countries like China, in government in circumstances that favoured drastic changes· 
i~Jlemen- Another factor of idnportance in making reform effective is the creation of institutions to• 
~ only implement the reforms 0nce legislated and to press for continuing development. This 
· "-'<l1en there usually involves organizing the beneficiaries to create follow-up pressure. 
vwi-s a For example, in Japan, Taiwan and Kenezuela, suitable institutio~s were established 
~ange to ensure' that land was ndeed trans.ared.8 In Pakistan, a commun itry of interests 
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between landowners and officials, combined with an absence of organized pressure 
from the beneficiaries, largely nullified reform efforts. The basic objectives behind the 
land reforms introduced in 1959, 1972 and 1977 in Pa~Ttan were to bring about a 
red istribut iot:'l of land ownership by en.Parrg ing th,e size/Che landholding of· the rural 
poor and by reducing the size of the holding of the large owners through enforcing a 
legal ceiling .. But where land reform was acco,mpauied by compensation as in 1959 ~iB~>q 
reform, the tf!l'Ile:-rn was not prepared sometimes to purchase ownership rights . 
Redistributiof. ~hroggh ceiling legislation has not made a!O\y significant difference 
because of the erosion of the lavy by fictitiol'.ls partHtions arrived at for purposes of 
avoiding the ceiling. This does not however, mean that land reform has no place in 
Pakistan now, it has, but the extent of its effective implementation would depend upon 
the factors illustrated above. As these factors donot exist at present, any attempt at 
introducing another land reform in Pakistan is unlikely to succedd~ 
As regards tenany reforms, the rights of the tenant households are already 
fairly covered by the radical provisions of 1972 land reforms. They only need to be morE 
vigorously implemented,.(Most of these radical provisions have been illustrated in 
Chapter 4). Another~_r;iur.l01l reform, not tOltvched upon in the 1972 reforms may be that 
the rents to be paid by the tenants may be fixed in cash unless the tenant wants to go in :c) 
for share-cropping. All rents payable by the tenant may be paid, after deducting the 
costs which the landlord under the law is supposed to bear, into a i?>.gJJ:k and disbursed 
by it in cash to the landlord. This step shall minimise the chances of charging excessive 
rents b!}t tme·..,larndlut"d froth cthe tenant. The type of tenancy reform whereby the tenants 
become owners of the land they operate, as it happened in Japan, Taiwan and ,some 
p5arts of Europe is not suggested because it involves a lot of turmoil, political unne:S:t, 
b loads ltBd and loss of production. The tenancy reform most suited to a country like 
Pakistan should include stablization of the position of 1-<the tenant with respect to c- ,--,::: 
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rent paid, security of tenure, and labour objectives without transfering ownership 
rights to them. Here the main focus should be promotion of more efficient types of 
tenancy with contracts having we 11 defined incentives and deter<rents. The fixed 
cash rent contract seems to be superior to the more common crop-share coat racts, 
since the whole income in excess of the fixed rent accrues to the actual cultivator • 
Share cropping has its own benefits as it provides risk insurance and is Relatively 
more suited to the landlord who may get more compensation of the costs incurred 
through crop-sharing. But in the case of a fixed rent contract, the cultivating 
farmer would psychologically feel more scure because of the feeling that he is 
going to get the whole farm income in excess of the fixed rent. The more seouce 
producres tend to invest part of their higher earnings in their holdings and 
thus raise the level of investment in agricultural production. Finally, greater 
security enables tenants to beeefit from appropriate technological changes, 
instead of being displaced when landlords find it to their advantage to adopt 
a different technology. "The financial returns to the landlord from using 
machines and hired labour may be high, but the returns to the economy 
are usually higher from labour intensive operations undertaken by small l 
holders" 10. This means that the provision of greater security of tenure and 
improved rental contracts l\iave a positive effect on development and the thrust of 
the public policy should, therefore, be geared towards this direction • 
The strategy more suited to a country like Pakistan where most of 
the people live on land is the strategy of meeting basic needs of every one 
through an agricultural policy that develops agricultural along-side social 
justice. The objective to meet everyone's basic needs has been 
very explicity reflected in the Fifth 5 year plan going to conclude on 30 11 
June, 1 983 and is going to be reflected in the Sixth 5 year plan to be launched on 12 
first July, 1983. Dr,. Mahbul-ul-Haq, who is presently Pakistan's Deputy 
Chairman, Planning Commission, is himself one of the first exponent~ 'Jf basic 13 
needs. Food, clothing, shelter, education, health, sanitation, clean drinking 
water and some public transport are the main features of this strategy • 
This strategy has the support and patronage of the International Labour 
Organization and is a further refinement of the idea of "redistribution with 
growth" and thereby the idea of social justice. 14 . 
This approach holds that development planning should set minimum 
targets in each of the fields like adequate food, clothing, shelter, healthcare 
education, employment and the right to participate in making the decisions that 
affect them. It has got two sets of needs. The first set of needs involves a 
basic level of private consumption consistent 'i''titn survival, good health for work, 
and school and dignity. A minimum diet would vary, according to region between 
2180 and 2380 calories per person. Every family should be able to afford a basic 
range of household equipment, like pots and pans, a minimum atn:ount of clothing 
according to the climate and standards of public decency, minimum shelter 
adequate in space and for protection against the elements. 15 . 
The second set of needs is the essential services that Government 
provides. Clean water and sanitation, health services, public transport, basic 
education and if necessary, family planning. 16. These needs are largely unmet 
for the maJority of the rural and urban poor in Pakistan because of the previous 
government's, discrimination m in favour of the modern city sector. The Govt. now 
would hav,e to calculate a basic needs income which could purchase for the average 
poor fat:1iily the required quantity of goods; _minimum standards would have to be set 
in terms of a certain percentage of house holds with access to each 
service, target level for infant mot~tality, life 
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e-xpectat.ij_on.1, disease incidence or enrolment at school. In each case, performance 
would have to be measured area by area, social group by social group, to make sure 
that averages did not conceal large inequities. The fina'l and central basic need is 
employment generation; without jobs, the poor will not be able to' earn the money 
to satisfy their basic needs • 
To meet every one's basic needs in the rural areas of Pakistan would 
need development of a 11 the sectors like health, education, communications, 
but as agriculture is the mainstay of Pakistan's economy whi~h .accounts for 
32% of GDP, employs 53% of the labour force, supports 70% of the populatlon, 
it is through the development of agriculture that the basic needs of the majority 
of the rural population are to be met. Explaining various components of this 
strategy, Dr. Mahbul-ul-Haq told the Review that," we must consolidate and 
build on the recent remarkable advance in agricultural 'production. Both our 
present potential and future needs demand that agriculture should be !tJiven the 
highest priority in our national planning". 17 
,_ ' 
The role of agriculture in meeting basic nee\ds __ of ,the rural people 
is that Agricultural development can be seen as a technical means of. increasing 
food production or agricultural output and as an essential step to social .justice. 
Development may be measured and recorded in many'ways, but essentially it is 
about people, who seek through it to improve their con(jitions and to ensure for_, 
their childern a less arduous and more prosperous life. In the rural areas of 
Pakistan, where most of the people 1 ive on land, ):'hey can hope 'to do these things 
for goods and services produced by people in other places or sectors. In this 
way, agriculture and the agriculturist not only meets his basic needs, but also 
contributes towards the over-all deyelopment of the country. T.he country cannot 
continue to make progress withowt,.a big increase in the efficiency with which 
farmers use fertilizer and water, as· well as a signfficent rise in the yields 
per acre, which are extremely low by internatior:ial standards. Seen in the 
contest of Pakistan, the strategy qf Basic Needs involves agricultural 
development on a massive scale •. Its main emphasis is lihe distribution of the 
unequal gains of agricultural modernisation and the provision of jobs to the 
agricultural labourers declared surplus by farm mechanisation. Where there 
is a large rural population and weal;< industrial base in the towns and where the 
introduction of modernised agricultural technology makes for larger band-holdings 
and changed factor intensities in production (as we have seen in Chapter 5), 
there is frequently a problem of the loss of jobs, with few opportunities for 
employment else-where. The object of the agricultural policy in the 19BO's should therefc 
re be an adoption of a strategy.which takes account of the needs of all the rural 
population, not just a segment of it • 
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C>mrn:lus ion 
The defects existing in the prevalent production system in Pakistan's 
agriculture can be removed by pursuing argicultural modernisation alongside 
social justice. This objective is to be achieved through meeting the basic 
needs of the rural people~Land reform which is an important plank in the Basic 
Needs strategy is not desirable because the man-land ratio is so low in Pakistan 
that there are not ample opportunities for redistributing land so that inequalities 
can be diminished and the recipients of the land can generate an acceptable 
minimum income. Moreover a land reform is rarely undertaken without 
considerable upheaval and loss of production, which may aggv.avate and 
enhance the conflict already existing between the various social groups in the 
rural a~eas of Pakistan and which a developing country like Pakistan cannot 
afford. The viable course of action open to the government, therefore, should 
be to achieve the purpose of the 3 successive land reforms introduced in the 
country in 1959, 1972 and 1977, which were ind1ffe:rtently implemented in the past • 
The main focus of the administration should be the effective 
implementation of the provisions regarding land tenure. The 1972 land reforms 
presor,-ibe for the landlord to pay all taxes and water rents and half the cost 
of fertilizer: seeds and other inputs. His share is limited to 50% and he cannot 
evict the tenant as long as he tills the land and pays the rent. These are very· 
good provisions and need to be~ic~enforced. Measures are also required 
to be taken to strictly regulate landlord tenant relations so that the landlord may 
not charge excessive rent. Preference may be given, if possible, to the 
fixed-cash-rent. contracts under which the tenant would feel, psychologically 
more secure. The provision of greater security of tenure and improved rental 
contracts have a positive effect on development and thereby are comme-,nsurate 
with the basic needs strategy • 
Security of tenure and tenancy reform are an important plaok of the 
Basic needs strategy and need to be vigorously enforced. Other important 
segments of this strategy which are desirable and need to be enforced in 
Pakistan are the ~?e".1e:' of the next Chapter • 
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CHAPTER 7 
MODERNISATION VERSUS EQUITY -
ALTERNATIVE POLICY APPROACHES 
We haye seen in the previous chapters that the small 
farmer in Pakistan has sustained deterioration in terms of trade 
through the pub.lie policies adopted by the successive governments 
of Pakistan. The present regime seems intent on tackling the 
problem through Agrarian reform. However the 
agrarian ref~rm introduced so far appears to be against the _ 
interests of the small farmer. By small farmer is meant a farmer 
with a mtnimum viable holding of 5 irrigated acres here. However, 
his defin~tion in Pakistan may vary from time to time and from 
province to province. The present -regime have ,_introduced the 
Revised Action Programme for Irrigated Agricultur~ (RAP) in the 
form of the National Agricultural Policy, 1980 referred to in the 
previous chapters. T,he government have taken several important 
measures to implement these new policy directions, aimed at 
reducing input subsidies, in order to release resources for other 
high priority areas to provide adequate incentives to produce~s 
through appropriate output-price adjustments and to transfer 
activities to the private sector, wherever feasible. These measures 
reinforced by subsequent decisions include about 50% increase in 
'retail prices of fertilizers; a 25% increase in margins allowed to 
fertilizer dealers other than co-operatives and a nearly 50% 
increase for co-ope~atives;and finally privatization of the import 
and. distribution of Resticides and the elimination of the subsidy 
on pesticides in Punjab and Sind. The increases in crop support 
prices during -1980 ranged from 9% for seed cotton 17% for basmati 
paddy, 20% for wheat and Irri-6 rice and 29% for sugarcane~ The 
sale of fertilizer is still being subsidized, but the amount of 
subsidy is being gradually reduced. For 1981-82, for example, the 
provision of subsidy was reduced from Rs .2423 million (_in 1980-81) 
to Rs. J.950 million. Subsidy on improved seed is being continued, 
but generally the seed supplied by the public sector agencies is 
yet to generate confidence in the farming community. An aerial 
spray.of pesticides as a_.freeservice has also been dis-continued 
in Punjab and Sind, where cost of this service would now be re-
covered in full from the beneficiaries. 2 
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The privatization of this service is in the right direc-
tion in the sense that it now provides equal opportunities for all 
size categories of falflBIB".::' to utilize it. But in another sense, 
it may again go in favour of the middle and large farmers who 
continue to control the market and have enough resources to invest 
in the utilization of such services. Reduction in the amount of 
subsidies may be defended on the grounds that they were initially 
introduced as a sort of the "come on" or the "quid pro quo" strategy 
for promoting the green revolution package of inputs and practices 
and that now that purpose has been achieved. But as we have seen in 
the previous chapters, that very purpose has not been adequately 
achieved in the case of small farmers. Reduction in the amount of 
subsidies or their gradual with --drawal would promote further pau-
perisation of the small cultivator .and~, tenant. Government's new 
initiative to reduce subsidies and to increase prices of the key 
inputs is a right step for the medium and large farmers who were 
investing massively on the use of subsidized inputs and thereby 
were consuming the amounts of. subsidies disproportionately, but 
the small and. the: marginaL farmer_. sti 11 needs the financ~ al suppo:rt 
of the g.overnment in order to make his farming activity as viable . 
FAVOURED ACCESS TO INPUTS . 
In order to achieve the objective of ~eeting basic needs 
/ 
through growth with justice strategy, the small farmer, requires a 
special package of policies that will give him a due shar.·e of the 
/ 
gains from the new technology. This can be done by enabling the 
small farmer adequately to U:til~~- the :modern technology through a 
~oured access_to the inputs. There are, however, several com-
plicating factors involved. First, new technology is not neutral 
to scale in a complete sense as some inputs like water or mecha-
nisation are indivisible units that involve capital invesT.ment 
beyond the economic capa·c·ity of the small farmer. Second, giving 
the small farmer equal or favoured access to inputs does not auto-
matically mean that he will use them, partly because he may not have 
the necess~ry response skills and partly because he may find it 
both more profitable and less taxing to sell the inputs for cash to 
other farmers in the black mR.rket rather than use them. himself with 
all the extra effort and risk3 involved. Third his social and 
cultural status is soinferior tC) that of the big landlord and the 
local bureaucrats that where he has to share t~e organisational 
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facilities for getting access to inputs with the big landlord, he 
is bound to be discriminated against. All these factors ·need to be 
taken into account in studying the feasibility of this policy 
recommendation . 
The small farmers, if enabled to use modernised agri-
cultural technology will no doubt, record a rapid rise in produc-
tivity and obtain a reasonable minimum income and a fair share in 
the gains accruing from agricultural modernisation, thus enabling 
the government to fulfil the objective of increased production 
with social justice, as laid down in the National Policy document 
and as necessitated by the Basic Needs approach buttressed by the 
present regime. Establishment of an organisation for providing 
favoured access to agricultural inputs may be eligible to get 
financial support from the United Nations, IBRD and other similar 
organisations as agriculture and the small farrrers which_ headed the l'ist 
of possible approaches in the search for more meaningful development 
al ternat_i ves in the begining of the second U. N .Development decade 
in 19.71-is_ still receiving fairly adequate attention of these organi-
sations. National commitment to solve the problems of the poor al-
ready exists; this commitment may help to overcome the opposition 
of big landlords and vested urban and rural interests to the irnpl~­
mentation of the proposed favoured access to the inputs policy. If 
the charge of the grassroot banches of the organisation which will 
provide favoured access to the inputs to the small farmers is ,en,-
trusted to a small farmer within the supervision of chairrnan,union 
council, he may have some enhanced degree of ability to implement 
this policy prescription, for the chairman union council is in a 
better position to act as a sort of pressure on the bureaucracy . 
Furthermore, the ability to implement this policy prescription is 
clearly related to the ability to promote consensus, weaken vested 
interest groups likely to lose from this policy and organise support 
from the groups who would benefit . 
EMPLOYMENT CREATfON 
There are, however, one million non-viable households of 
marginal farmers with operational holding below 5 acres of irri-
gated land who have to supple~ent their income by either working 
as an agricultural labourers or engaging themselves in some other 
occupation. They may not be able to benefit very much from the 
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_proposed favoured access to inputs policy }?ecause thelr. fa:rm· size is 
extrer:iely small. They can be enabled to meet their basic needs oy 
divers';ifyiu'g their farming occupation, say by giving them a cow _or a 
buffalo so that they can-take.to milk production t0 supplement their 
agricul tU:rar-· output. Al ternati ".ely, they can be given facilities 
\ 
to go in 1 for a poultry farming or other activity allied to agricul-' 
ture whe'.l'.'e this small land holding will give them an'.,;·add~tional-base . 
If such a policy is, somehow, implemented with efficiency, it will 
! 
lift the marginal farmers above the limits of poverty and enable 
'~ ' 
them' to contribute their quota to additional productiqn 'thus also 
' / ,.J~ 
promoting social justice. 
The only other agricultural class that remains to be dealt 
with is that of another one million house·holds of agricultural 
·labourers who derive either the whole or the major portion of their 
income by hiring their labour. Some of them may own a small :p:iece of 
land say half or quarter of an acre .. or less and sue it for getting 
part of their grain and vegetable requirements, but majority of them 
are landless and depen-d wholly on the wages they receive for their 
labour. The initial effect of agricultural modernisation has, on the 
whole, been favourable to them in t·erms of both wages rates and number I 
of days for which employment was available, _that is in the form of 
assisting the farm?r in handling of large volumes of output. But while: 
irrigation, multi-cropping and.increases in output has promoted more 
employment and be-tter wages, mechanisation has had adverse effects 
on employment. Whereas the tubewell/fertilizer/seed technology is 
complementary to labour and even increases the demand for labour, 
tractor mechanisation replaces it. Bose and Clark found in their 
interviews with farmers who had invested in tractors a consistent 
respons·e that they had reduced their labour force by, on average',56% 
from what it had been prior to tractor mechanisation~ Therefore_, if . 
tractor mechanisation continues along present trends, the ~gricul­
tural sector is very likely to fall short o~ its employment-creating 
/ 
function which is the central object of the _basic needs strategy . 
\, 
There is a direct relationship between me··chanisation and 
employment. Mechanisa~ion may replace manual work and bullock labour 
and may at the same time in~rease labour demand arising from mecha-
nisation-induced expended production. But this increase in labour 
demand takes place at the expense of the.eviction of ~enants class 
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which comprises of the 47% of the agricultural house-holds of 
Pakistan (see chapter 6). Nulty writing in .1971 visualized that a 
lot of big absentee landlords, in future, (if not already) would 
evict tenants and resort to much more profitable self-cultivation 
and employ the evicted tenants as hired labourers. A 100 acres 
landlord in this way would she calculates, save at least Rs. 5 to 6 
thousand per year after paying for all the hired labour and inputs 
etc~ Since 1971 onwards there has been a fairly large expansion in 
commercial farm operation in Pakistan. It is, therefore, necessary 
to revise national policy on mechanisation and set definite limits 
to the volume and type of mechanisation permitted in Pakistan. Such 
a policy of selective mechanisation should not only be negative in 
banning or setting limits to defined types of mechanisation, but 
/ 
should b8 positive also by promoting employment in agriculture. This, 
in turn, requires that such mechanisation should not be based on 
imports or large unit capacities but on domestic manufacture with 
emphasis on suitability for small rather than larger farms of 
machinery needing low, if not human or cattle, power to the maximum 
extent possible. 
With all this, there is still a danger of both unemployment 
and lower wages in areas of high density of agricultural population 
e.:gPunjab. To minimise its incidence, 2 steps may be recommended. One 
is the fixation of the minimum wages for agricultural labourers by 
the government; the other is to create opportunities for non-agri-
1 
cultural employment through a programme of rural public works and 
rural industriilization . 
Rural public works and industrialization pertains to a 
much broader field namely rural development and is outside the scope 
of this study, but as modern agricultu~al technology is one important 
item in the rural development,itwilL-riot-beirrelevant to discuss it 
here very briefly . 
In overall national development in Pakistan, rural develop-
ment is not only concerned with higher yields in agriculture, but 
also aims at tackling other problems such as high rate of population 
growth, inadequate job opportunities, lack of essential services 
such_ as health, education, drinking water S\tpply etc. In the past, a 
number of programmes were launched to improve the quality of life 
in the Tural areas like Village-Aid Programme in the 1950s, Rural 
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works programme, Basic Democracies Scheme, Agricultural Development 
Corporation in the 1960s, People 1 s works programme and Integrated 
Rural development programme in 1972-1977. Although these programmes 
did manage to achieve some measures of success, still"the results 
were not commensurate with the huge funds put into these programmes; 
their impact on rural economy specially on the underprivileged 
segment of the population was minimal"~ 
The concept and the progress of the programmes of IRDP and 
Peoples works programme were subjected to a critical review, removing 
the constraints which were impeding their smooth implementation by 
the present regime in 1978. The two programmes have now been merged 
together an.d the activity has been started under the name of "Rural 
developUfent" with the objectives to ( i) integrate rural development 
with the national socio-economic development effort; (ii) to reduce 
the burden of under-employment (iii) to increas the density and 
intensity of services provided to agriculture and other rural 
activities (iv) to improve rural infra-structure (v) to make a 
-beginning_- towards providing social amenities to target groups and 
(_vi) to create an institutional framework for ensuring: community 
participation in the implementation of the rural development 
6 programmes. 
The existing staff of the local government, IRDP and PWP 
departments has been merged into one cadre and redeployed to man 
the positions in the new Rural development organisation and placed 
under the supervisions of the district councils already discussed 
in chapter I. The important fact to be pointed out is that the 
financial allocations made to the rural development programmes have 
been spent so far on the expansion of rural roads, drinking water 
supply, primary education,health etc. but no special programmes 
have been introduced so far to increase employment opportunities in 
7 
the rural areas .. The th~ust of the rural development programmes 
- ' 
need to be redirected to the creation of specific employment opportu-
nities for the agricultural labourers declared surplus by farrri1._J_ 
mechanisation through (-1) di versification of agriculture (2) promo-
tion of agricultural activities allied to agriculture, (3) rural 
puhlic works for land development and infra-structure improvement -
settring·t\!P of agro-based industries and of local manufacturing units 
. ) - . 
to the extent technically possible, (4) deceB~r~alization of light 
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,I 
industries and their dispersal int? the rural areas. All these 
should be a part of the overall programme ~f rural development 
besides provision of drinking water, rural roads etc. on which the 
hulk of the funds are being spent. The appro~ch of area development 
and community development with creation of ample_ employment oppor-
' tuni ties should be a necessary complement to, th'e promotion of moder-
- l 
nisation of agriculture. Without it the new technology in agriculture 
,, 
and rural development programmes will fail to solve the problem of 
rural poverty and lead only to an inefficient and inequitable uti-
lization of its gains . 
FAMILY PLANNING AND AGRARIAN REFORM . 
----- ----------·-
Both agricultural modernisation and rural development pro-
grammes need to be linked with the famrly planning programmes for 
one cannot ignore·the growing population increasing at the rate of 
3% per annum. T~e Family Planning is again 'a wider and differnet 
discipline and out~ide the scope of this study, but is again inex~ 
tricq,bly interlinked with the fulfillmen t of the-:. objective of 
meeting basic needs-of the rural poor. Pakistan's experience with 
' I 
Family Planning has by now disillusioned the policy-nia,l{ers· for the 
programme did not become as popular as was expected. Ultimately, it 
has been merged into a broader _development concept "involving 
activities which influence people through education, community 
development and overall social change programmes 81.' The underlying 
assumption for. the perceived solution is that development generates 
a climate of modernisation leading to t~e innovation including 
these in the field of population planning, which might ultimately 
help achieve a small fam~ly 
It is not relevant here to either support or challenge the 
policy adopted to control population growth. What is relevant here 
is that one cannot ignore the growing -population which is bound to 
result in further sub-divisions and fragmentation of land and there-
fore to an increase in the number of uneconomic marginal and sub-
marginal holdings with all their distributional implications. The 
real solution is population control . 
REGIONAL -DEVELOPMENT . 
--------------
The uneven distributional gains of agricultural modernisa-
tion are not confined only to the agricultural rural classes, but 
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also to various regions; modernisation may lead to regional dis-
harmonies and conflict in a country like Pakistan where the economic 
region is also a linguistic or some other emotion-linked region. There 
are areas like Punjab and Sind where facilities of irrigation e~ist 
and therefore, they are easily adaptable to modernisation; _o_tl].ers~·are 
arid or semi-arid areas in Baluchistan for instance where the normal 
rainfall is very low and there is no technical possibility of intro-
ducing irrigation . 
When development funds are limited, a choice_may have to be 
made between intensification of production on existing irrigated areas 
and extending irrigation facilities into areas having no such faci-
lities at the moment. A given increase in production could be brought 
about by intensive application of the new technology in the already 
irrigated areas or by extending irrigation to non-irrigated areas . 
From the point of view of regional social_ justice and without inter-
fering with the growth of production, it would appear to be a better 
policy to give priority to new irrigation projects in areas with 
little or no irrigation at the moment . This would, no doubt, involve 
much investment and much more time for fructification in the case of 
major irrigation projects like the construction of Chashma Right 
Bank Canal being presently undertaken in NWFP (from the river Indus), 
but, in future, preference may be given to minor projects requiring 
less capital investment, yielding quick results, providing more em-
ployment opportunities and involving less costs. Such preferences are 
necessary to reconcile increased production with social justice from 
the:~ - regional angle,_ As.regards low rainfall areas, semi-arid and 
arid regions, there is no scope for the application of the new agri-
cultural technology if these areas cannot have irrigation. They need 
a new technology for dry farming with new seeds better resistent to 
drought, able to s,urviMe on low moisture and responsive in terms of 
yield to more appropriate agronomic practices. This brings us to 
agricultural research . 
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT . 
Some detail has already been provided about the inadequacy 
of agricultural research facilities in Pakistan which need to be ex-
panded. It is very difficult to establish a direct relationship be-
tween research and so_cial justice for meeting everyon' s basic needs, 
The working objectives of the research scientist pertain to technical 
efficiency, product characteristics and production risks. Increased 
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production is the tmrned:Late res_earch ohjecti ve and the goal of 
improved income distrihution is not the immediate concern of the 
research scientist. Goals like economic growth, equity, nutrition 
and social welfare are to be set by the government and implemented 
thr0ugh concrete decisions and actions by the administration. The 
main object of research is to develop technology and that of the 
public policy to make that technology available to everyone by re-
moving h_urdles posed by the socio-economic and political structures 
in the rural areas . 
But in fact, research is inextricably linked with the 
factors which can achieve social justice. While the new technology 
developed through research undoubtedly makes for substantial increase~ 
in yield, it also increases susceptibility of the crops to pests and 
disease and thus increases the element of irsecurity and risk of 
the loss of the entite crop. In view of the fact that the new tech-
nology involves a big increase in chemical inputs which have to be 
obtained from outside the farm_=-· by purchase, the financial loss is 
much greater if the crop is lost than; is the case with the tradi-
tional variety. This means in turn that the small farmer whose 
ability to finance cash increases in his production costs is already 
very limited, can afford even less the large loss that a failure of 
the crop will bring. The element of risk undoubtedly increases with 
the aµplication of the new technology, both for the small and the 
big farmer, but its consequences are more severe for the small 
farmer and constitutes one of the major reasons for the uneven 
soical incidence of the resort to and gains from the new technology . 
Consideration of both growth and social justice requires 
that research is directed to such -matter~, for example by paying more 
attention to resistence to pests and diseases than to more increases 
in yield and to the fact that this resistance is built into the 
seeds by genetic research rather than by chemical research for 
application after germination and growth of the crop. This type of 
research is needed from the point ·:of, .:View_ of getting more small farmers 
to participate in the application of the new technology . 
Another field of research is the development of the shorter 
ctµr~tion of crops and therefore of multi-croping which not only 
increase production and employment but also make the small farm more 
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viable. The s.ocial and eq:u:tty o;rientation needed for scientific 
research in Pakistan '·s agrtcul tuxe, rec:i.uires that research should be 
dire,cted in larger measuxe on the poor man's cereal crops, on the poor 
man's protein crops., and on the agricultural regions where, either 
due to low or e~cessive rainfall, floods or drought, yields are low 
and cultivators thereby are poor. This means research on a more 
intensive scale in Pakistan on millets, sorghums, pulses, rice, . 
. wheat and corn. Research is laso needed into oilseeds which conE1titute 
the principal source of fat for the poor masses . 
Agricultural research is the means to generate knowledge 
and the dissemination of the knowledge, revealed through it, to the 
farmer is the ultimate end, except in the rare case where research 
is carried out for its own sake, This whole process of means and 
ends, that is _res~arch ·and_ extension need to be pursued in a com-
bined manner. Some detail has been provided about the inadequacy and 
ineffectiveness of extension agencies in Pakistan in chapter I. The 
first and foremost policy recommendation in this regard is the estab-
lishment of an effective link between extension and research which at 
present is very weak. Second, Effective extension service is also 
very difficult as the bulk of the agricultural population is illi-
terate, though· 1.attempts are being made to· liquidate rural illiteracy 
and provide out-of-school facilities for education through a TV and 
radio adult literacy campaign. Plans are also ahead to open one 
primary school with every mosque throughout the country and in fact 
5000 mosque schools in the province of Punjab have started function-
ing in February, 1982~ But these programmes still lack agriculture 
orientation. The adult literacy programmes must have a functional biaE 
for the farming population. Similarly, primary education in rural 
areas need to be re-organized with particular stress on environmental 
knowledge and work experience in agriculture and allied activities . 
In this connection, it may be proposed that during sowing and harves-
ting seasons, the entire school in the village should take part in 
the agricultural activities. Extension services cannot really funct-
ion effectively against a background of bookish knowledge with no 
practical experience . 
Third, it is not possible for the time-being to decentralizE 
extension work when the local bodies are still in their infancy and 
bulk of the rural population is illiterate. An extension worker, 
therefore, should at least give a feeling of belongingness to the 
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cul t:j_ vato;i:s a..m0ngst whom he works>·;· he ~hall haye to inspire their 
confidence not only by his technical experience but also by his noti-
ceable identification with the interest of the farmers and especially 
the small and marginal farmers and the tenants. This object can be 
achieved (j.) by training of the workers (ii) by restr~cting recruit-
ment to the post of extension worker only to pe~sons hailing from 
the class of small farmers and having a living connection with land 
either in his 0wn working life or in that of his near and dear ones. 
To pr0vide against the possible danger of becoming such recruits as 
bureaucratised or elitist, it is necessary to make him answerable to 
farmer's organisatiops duly represented by small farmers. While it is . 
important that the extension worker should command respect, it is 
not desirable to entrust him with the supply of inputs for the cul-
tivator§f .for--thiS fr1akes.·-him- a,_.powe·r-centre and a disposer of patronage . 
AGRJCULTURAL CREDIT . 
The problems involved in the supply of ~icultural credit 
have also been discussed in chapter I. The first policy recommendation 
is the adoption of specific measures designed to see that credit is 
available on reasonable terms, reaches all cultivators who need it and 
contains built in provisions against mis"U;;e and delay or default in 
repayment. Another policy option is the adoption of a federal system 
of credit reg:j_stration for all cultivators, irrespective of their 
tennurial status, based on their land holdings,history of previous 
---production, cash inputs and repayment of loans and the.ir current 
production programmes and cash requirements. These cards~ would have 
to be prepared at union council or tehsil council levels, but there 
~hould be provision for sample checks by higher officials. These 
cards sb0uld then serve as the document on the production of which, 
the farmer would be able to get the credit he needs from designated 
credit advancing agencies. Such credits, if necessary, may be guaran-
teed for repayment by the union council. The cards may oear all 
entr:i.es-of.-loaris giveri-'and repa:Yrrerrts made.,.anct·.a.:,balance· struck at the end of 
each agricultural year. This project,if necessary, may be tried out 
in a few pilot areas in order to identify operational difficulties and_ 
for devising improvements for making it viable. Small farmers and those 
covered under the fa~oured access t~npu~olicy may be issued 
special cards so that they are easily identified and face no diffi-
culties in getting the credit. This agricultural credit strategy can 
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in the long ;run, l)..e :j__ntegrated w:t th the broader strategy of basic 
needs and rural development . 
A vtable credit system requires both increases in product-
ivity from the utilization of the cTedit, and repayment of the credit, 
thereof. The crucial point is wh·eth.er- such credit facilities can be 
economically extended to what are called non-viab.le small farmers· 
The only solution in their case seems to be formation of these 
farmers as ·viable groups before becoming eligible for credit facili-
ties. The best way would be to start with group credit and then let 
other group activities develop in the natural~- course. Some such 
e.xperi.1nents have already been made in the Phillp]Dinei:;; 1 Malaysia and 
Bangladesh . 
ORGANISATIONAL ARRANGEMENTS, 
The above-noted policy prescriBtions may pose a lot of 
operational difficulties to the administratDrs_; S?.Jecific organisa-
tional arrangements for implemention of these policy prescriptions 
is a separate issue and outside the scope of this study.But it is 
. ' 
relevant to note here that the effective implement ion 10:f. these 
"-
policy prescriptions would involve development of the aaministrative 
resources of government as the directing agency of modernisation . 
The p9licy prescriptions like(i)regulation of landlord - tenant 
relations (ii );removB.l of regional disharmonies in the level of 
agricuiL'tural roodernisa tion existing in the various areas of 
Pakistan(iii)implemen~ation of the favoured access to inputs 
proposa:J_ to the~i·},;n;all farmers (iv) complementing of agricultural 
modernisation strategy oy rural development programmes and Family 
Planning programmes,and(v)implementation of national registration of 
the credit card scheme shall have to pass the test of feasibility 
but their success would largely depend upon the effectiveness of 
the administrative apparatus.Because of the divergences in interests 
among the big and medium landlords and the small :':ff. rmers and agricul-
.. 
tural labourers the administration must h~ve. ~n enhanced degree of 
ability to implement the favoured access or r_ other suggested prescr-
ipttons; this ahili ty is clearly related to the ability of the 
adninistration to promote consensus,weaken vested interest groups and 
organtse support from the groups who would_benefit,In this connection 
,..,, ! 
the active participation of small f1armers organisations would be 
an important factor.Given organised mass support.the vested interest 
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group~ ma.¥ nqt be a threat to. th.e. y:j:_a,U;l,l;L ty of the proposed policies, . 
hut the lack ot commitment to national development may reduce the 
etjiciency of their implementation . 
~ne main weakness of Pakistan 1 s administration is that it 
has little or no contact with the large poverty groups in rural 
areas.There is a sufficient commitment at the national level to 
remove their poverty,but this commitment needs to be created at the 
district,tehsil and village levels. The law and order,justice,land 
revenue and the local councils which affect the f·armer in his every 
day li,fe are administered at the provincial level .As regards agricul-
ture ,out of 38~1 officials working in this field,only 185 were work~ 
-ing at the Federal Government level in 1978; all the remaining 3626, 
that is 95.2% officials were working under the administrative cont-
rol of the Provinces~O Thus the real commitment to social justice 
and to the ful=illment of"basic needs" needs to be transferred to 
the provinces and especially to the Tehsil, Union Council and 
village level. We have also seen in chapters 2-3 that the bureaucrat 
also tends to align himself with the middle and larger farmer. In 
such a situation, local government's administrative set up may be 
tried out to act as a sort of pressure to the agricultural adminis-
tration to provide easy access to the small farmer. Local Government 
in Pakistan has, in fact, played an important function in the past 
both in the development process directly and by removing certain 
bureaucratic constraints in favour of the poor peasantry . 
INTER~ATIONAL ACTION . 
It is a matter of satisfaction that there appears to be 
some international recognition of the problem of rural poverty of 
the developing world including Pakistan. But international aid is 
always tied to certain conditions which may hamper recipient govern-
ment's programmes of development . 
It is a matter of great concern that the Basic Needs 
strategy no longer enjoys the enthusiastic support of the World 
Bank. The turn of the second U.N. development decade has seen funda-
mental philo-sophical changes in World Bank's d~velopment thinking . 
With the departure of many of its major supporters from the World 
Bank, like Robert Mcnamara, Mehbub-ul-Haq, and Paul Streeton, the 
Keynesian welfare state approa<bh to i:tiJ.ternational development ,epi to-
mised/by the hostile reception meted out to the Brandt Report 11is 
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gaining currency. Dr. Mehbub-ul-Haq, now Pakistan's Deputy Chairman, 
Planning Commission, while resigning from the World Bank wrote that 
the"------goddess of growth----- (is returned)-----to her pedestal"~2 
Basic Needs strategy has now given way to growth st.rategies.- and to 
the Structural Adjustments policies as a vehicle for their imple-
mentation. Structural Adjustments mean_(i) giving greater weight to 
growth objectives as compared to income distributional objectives and 
(ii) adoption of policies which should "give emphasis to measures 
that raise the productivity of the poor rather than increase con-
sumption through the provision of public services or government 
subsidies 1 ~ 11 To Riggott, the rationale of structural adjustments is 
their supposed facilitation of export-led growth 1~ 
This development has made the task of meeting basic needs 
of people very difficult for a developing country like Pakistan . 
being a developing country, Pakistan has to accept aid from the World 
Bank with structural adjustments conditions. In 1982, Pakistan nego-
tiated a US$ 140 million quick disbursing structural adjustments 
loan (SAL) from the bank for the fiscal year 1983 and such loans for 
next 2 years will also be negotiated with the bank on the same 
conditions. The Bank's SAL's aim is a "longer-term structural reform 
in the economy 151.' The Bank would"like Pakistan to improve its pro-
gramme in the agricultural and energy sectors as well as to cut 
government subsidies on various items such as food and fertilizers 
further10 '.' This development has, therefore, coincided with tbe 
reduction in the amount of subsidies in the national agricultural 
policy as illustrated in this chapter. This development of sturctural 
adjustments with its emphasis on export-oriented industrialization 
is bound to lead Pakistan to the further commercialization of the 
agricultural sector by promoting cash crops for exports and agro-
based export-oriented industrialization . 
This development is contrary to the concept of the fulfill-
ment of basic needs and requires to be checked. Here it needs to be 
pointed out that Pakistan is in the initial phases of Islamisation of 
laws. The basic guiding principles of social justice are described 
in the Holy Quran in the phrase, "Adl and Ehsan", that is justice 
and Equity. The Holy Quran says" "Lo! Allah enjoineth al-Adlwal-
~san 1711 (16:90). This is a view of a society in Balance. Speaking 
to the Far ~as.tern Economic Review, Dr. Haq told -tnat "the heart of 
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an Islamic society is social justice which is reflected in Adl and 
Ehsan, that is justice and equi ty 11 ~ 8·.rhis concept of justice and 
equity is in complete conf0rmity with the concept of Basic Needs 
and is required to be pursued if the country's programme for the 
Islamisation of laws is to be pursued for solving the socio-economic 
problems of the country . 
The structural Adjustments policies contrary to the norms 
of social justice need to be resisted. Bulk of the resources for 
developing agricluture and meeting basic needs can be generated by 
Zakat funds (Zakat is one of the pillars of Islam_ underJ.wh<i>ch every 
muslim surrenders 2.5% of his savings for disbursement to the needy . 
Zak at ordinance is already in force t9 and Ushr - (Ushr is a kind of 
agricultural tax (5% of the produce) levied by Quran and is being 
~o introduced in the country in July-1983 ). In case World Bank and 
other International Organisations donot sanction aid except on SAL's 
conditions contrary to the basic needs strategy, the necessary 
financial assistance may be sought from the oil-rich countries of 
Saudi Arabia and Kuwait. These two countries have already shown much 
enthusiasm in helping Pakistan to Islamise its laws . 
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_ghapter 8 
Conclusion 
As it has been seen in chapters 6-7, a number of policy options face Pakistan 
in dealing with the new technologies of agriculture and their impact on the vast 
masses of the rural poor. One policy option arises in regard to the new technology 
itself because of the recent energy arises and because of the dependence of the 
technology 9n non-renewable natural resources and methods of man,ufacture that 
lE2._Q.Ql to environmental 1po~'lt1.ici0~~.-:. Bavid Piemental has cat led for a :t'e'vers al of-°'l:ne 
policy that makes agricultural growth dependent on chemicat
1
inputs of both fertilizers 
and fj3stbides and mechanical energy powered by fossil fuels . 
But to set the clock back in the fashion suggested by Piementa l w.e l l only 
hurt the country which has just begun to use fertilizers on any significant scale and 
whose needs for agricultural modernisation are much greater both for meeting 
basic needs as also for getting its economy to commence a take -off from pove;,.ty . 
But agricultural modernisation with its emphasis on fertilizers and ~esticides"is bound 
to create problems not anticipated earlier and there is now a policy option of going 
in for modern technology with redistribution of growth to those poor farmers who 
cannot afford to apply it, or of devising other ways of meetir:-ig tf;ie need for plant 
nutrients by paying more attention to orga.rmic' and green man!:lces or m~king spec'ial 
national and international arrangements for a favoured ppsition being §l'h/en ,: to the 
rural poor in the allocation of the supply of chemical fertilizers. Possibly, Pakistan 
will have to think in terms of combining all these factors . 
The second policy option is in regard to mechanizat·ion as against labour 
intensive techn1tques for agricultural operations. There is , in fact, no option as 
far as using mechanical power for drawing water is concerned. Iifrtgct:tio1""1; pump sets 
and tube-wells have come to stay and wit l need to be expanEled. But other ferms of 
mechanisation are optional, depending upon the size-distribution of holdings, the 
pressure of pQpl:;llation , the availability of land, and the social philosophy of the 
govt. in power. Here the option in practice, will not be between mechanisation and 
no mechanisation, but between the items to be included in selective mechanisation, 
and the, rf)ace at which it is to be introduced . 
A third policy option arises as between the itntensification of modern 
technology to already more developed - areas and its ei><teosion to the agriculturally 
less developed areas-Where funds are limited and there are regional disparities, 
better policy option is tqe:xt-er-ial modernisation to less developed areas . 
A fourth policy option is between concentrating exclusively on agricultural 
modernisation proper and adopting a programme of rural development in which 
agricultural modernisation, of course, will have a prominent place. There is , 
in fact, no dispute that in general agricultural development and rural development 
have come to be accepted as the overall frame-work for a policy of rural 
development. In Pakistan where there is a massive rural U1-employment, illiteracy, 
poverty, the t'}_Onms of social justice demand that the agricultural development 
strategy should be complemented by the rural development strategy since with the 
increase in mbour force that population growth and f~r.r® mechanisationbrin_g- about, 
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!\''ore-employment opportunities have to be found through rural development 
programmes • 
A fi~h policy option is between enhancing the role of the federal governmer:i_t 
in agricultural administration and strengthening the poor linkages.between the market 
manipulation and incentive strategies of the federal government and field level 
extension and distribution programmes of the provincial governments. Owing to 
, the diversity in ecological ,settlement,cr.opping and marketing conditions which makes 
it;::impossible for the federal government to effect any detailed physical planning 
of the agricultural sector, the enhancement of the role of the federal government in 
agricultural administration is not desirable. The linkages between the national 
agricultural policies and the provincial field level activities however need to be 
strengthened. Similarly, agricultural research and extnesion need ~ -
to be pursued in a comeif'.'ledmanner under the respective proviocial a_dministrations . 
The first conslusion that presents fltse lf is that neither agricultural 
modernisation nCT" rural development programmes are going to provide the long-term 
answer to the poverty of the rural areas of Pakistan, if its population keeps growing 
faster than its growth rate. How populati0n growth is to be controlled is a larger 
question and falls outside the scope of this study. But it is relevant to note that 
an effective policy of population control is a necessary condition for ensuring full 
employment and raising levels of productivity and income for its agricultural 
population • 
The second conclusion of this Situdy, based on the research findings of so many 
writers some of wh_ich have been quoted in Chapters 3-5, i.s that agricultural 
modernisation in Pe1.kdstani is leading to larger holdings, a diminution in tenoo•try, 
and an increase ·in the ~arginalisation of the small farmer, capital intensification 
including mechanisationi;land purchase and increased cash inputs, more use of 
hired labour, and increasing production mainly for the market. What seems to be 
emerging is a R'ir:id of capitalistic farming with a new and a dynamic mriiddle class of 
farmers adopting modernised agricultural technology and acquiring a new social 
and political power such as has not been seen before in the rural areas of Pakistan • 
Big landlords are also resorting to self-cultivation by ejecting their tenants 
for if they qonot do it, they may lose ground to those landlords who have· joined the 
dynamic rar.:1ks of the new middle-agricultural class which is acting as p:tce-setters 
for the modern technology. The marginal and small farmers are losing ground except 
that some of the mo,re enterprising among therm have also joined the can~s of the 
dynamic middle class in agriculture • 
The third conclusion is that if capitalistic farming b~-comes the ruling form, it 
spells a dark future'.- for the rural fB·easantt:ry_/ many of whom may give up 
agriculture and emigrate to the towns in search of a better !ivelihood while the rest 
may s:t-ay1 on the farms _- as an inferior class in the rural hierarchy . 
The larger number of people has added to the pressure of population on the land • 
The fourth conclusion of this study is that in order to feed the growing rural 
population adequately, a sustained and ~-igopous agricultural growth is necessary in 
Pakistan provided it is pursued (the study recommends) ~longs ide social justice 
with emphasis on rural development. This would require(. policies involving a 
greater emphasis on improving welfare rather than simply increasing production 
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and on the development of non-farm_ employment in rural areas. This task is not 
very easy as the rate of growth in the labour force in Pakistan's rural areas 
is too large as compared with the rate of growth in the demand for labour. Rural 
urban migration is not a solution for without rapid industrial growth 
and con~equent enhancement of employment opportunities , it would only displace 
the problem from the countryside to the cities. One shall therefore, have to 
loOK to vigorous agricultural growth along-side social justice and this is the 
ultimate conclusion of this study . 
The study in the end suggests measures through which agricultural 
growth alongside social justice can be achieved. These measures include building 
into the agricultural production patterns a system of special programmes for the 
small farmer by giving him easy and if possible favoured access to all the inputs be 
requires , diversification of farming profession of the non-viable marginal farmer; 
getting small farmers, marginal farmers and tenants to organise themselves for 
receiving the benefits of indivisible inputs and giving them a political weightage and 
administrative patronage against the vested tnterest groups who may cause hurdles 
in the way of these groups to beceive these facilities • 
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